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ABSTRACT 
Author: Abdulatef Halawani 
Title: Privatization and its impact on national economy with a close look at 
Saudi Arabian Airlines 
Institution: Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Business Administration in Aviation 
Year: 1996 
This thesis investigates the possibility of privatizing Saudi Arabian Airlines. 
The research study has been divided into different sections. The author 
investigates the privatization programs in airlines and airports. 
A number of airlines have been chosen to evaluate the effectiveness of 
privatization. An overview of Saudia regional performance was conducted. This 
was done to show the Saudia position among other regional carriers. The last 
chapter includes a regression analysis and empirical findings. 
The major finding of the research study concluded that Saudi Airlines 
would have been profitable if it had been privatized at the same time as British 
Airways. The research has very well supported the government of Saudi Arabia's 
decision to privatize the national airline. To materialize the idea, a concrete and 
thorough study on Saudi Arabian Airlines' financial and administrative condition 
has been conducted. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
LI Definition of Privatization 
Privatization means the transfer of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) to the 
private sector. In other words, it is allowing the private sector to partake in 
government-owned sectors or to participate in the operation of the entity. 
Privatization has different meanings, depending on the country in which it is 
used. In Canada, privatization refers to the movement of an entity from the federal 
government to a local or quasi-government where a private sector model would be 
used. In England, privatization describes a political policy of the national 
government. In Japan, privatization takes the form of a government entity which is 
partially owned by the private sector. In the former eastern bloc countries, 
privatization is seen as a carrier of global change, a key to a rise in productivity and 
efficiency. 
The meaning of privatization by each country is interpreted differently, but 
the primary goal is basically the same, which is to improve efficiency and 
productivity. 
1
 Bijan Vasigh, Medhi Haririan, Airport Privatization: Procedures and Methods. 
(Lansdowne, VA: Transportation Foundation, Inc., 1994), 393. 
2 
The process of privatization may assume a number of forms. In complete 
divestiture, publicly owned assets may be completely transferred by sale to private 
individuals or firms after which the government bears no further responsibility for 
the operation of the assets. Gray Cowan believes that this is the clearest and most 
desirable form of privatization, but it is often the most difficult to accomplish.2 The 
reason for this method is the most desirable, because the government will no longer 
be involved in the decision making. Also, the government will no longer be 
responsible to cover financial problems. 
2
 L. Gray Cowan, Privatization in the Developing World. (New York, NY: Praeger 
Publishers, 1990), 6. 
3 
1.2 Why Privatize 
There are several reasons why a country would embrace the concept of 
privatization. First, the global trend toward privatization is one of the key factors. 
This global trend is the result of the massive amount of national debt with which the 
governments have to deal. Privatization could improve performance, utilize 
available resources, and help eliminate the poor management/ In those countries 
which have not adopted privatization, production and labor cost are higher than 
those who adopt the privatization process. 
The Saudi public sector faces the same dilemma in some industries. Some 
industries in Saudi Arabia have higher costs of operation due to several reasons. 
The lack of using the latest technology and slower or no development in the process 
of the system that they use make the work less efficient. Second is the absence of 
competition, which plays an important factor in ameliorating the current situation. 
Companies that dominate the market by being the only supplier tend to have 
higher service charges and rank lower on services. This situation could be improved 
substantially by promoting competition. The need for private and public sector to 
join in and participate in running State Owned Enterprise (SOE) is desired now 
3
 Farouq Akder, Privatization of The Saudi Economy Between The Analysis and The 
Application, (Jeddah: Saudi Research and Publication Company, 1994), 6. 
4 
more than at any other time. This is because of the continued loss of opportunities 
and the lag behind in using technology to help amend services. 
Another reason for privatization is the dissatisfaction of the performance of 
the SOEs, which could be the main motive behind privatization. Furthermore, cash 
infusion to the government that would be generated by the sale is another factor. 
The Saudi Arabian government has announced a strategic plan to spin off 
some of the state-owned enterprises in the future. It is an important step toward 
changing the way they do business. Saudia (SV), the national airlines, will undergo 
the privatization process. The goal is to transfer the airline from a cost center to a 
profit center with the help of the private sector. In order for this process to succeed, 
the government should help by eliminating or modifying some of the rules and 
regulations which are imposed on the airline, so that they can compete freely with 
others in the global market. 
Some of these rules imposed on the airline, such as: 
• Domestic prices are fixed and are below operational costs. 
• Aircraft purchase/sale must be approved by the government. 
• Saudia aircraft are dedicated to government operation in some cases such 
as a relief operation or need for special government use. 
• International operation to countries of economic and political interest and 
frequent connections for quick communications, as in case of GCC 
countries ( Gulf Cooperation council), are needed. 
5 
These rules have an impact on the overall performance of Saudia. S V loses 
revenue with the fixed domestic fare, sometimes even below operational cost. The 
restriction on aircraft purchase may not coincide with Saudia long-term strategic 
plans. 
6 
1.3 Objectives 
Privatization is one of the new ideas that concern the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia; it is a process that requires a lot of work and efforts in order to be done 
successfully. The main objectives behind privatization are to improve efficiency, 
increase productivity, and eliminate financial burden of the government. The goals 
and objectives of government-owned and private enterprise companies are totally 
different. The state-owned enterprise tends to be highly centralized decision making 
and is based on bureaucracy, while the privately-owned company tends to be 
decentralized in most cases and more efficient in doing the same work. The 
difference between the centralized and decentralized appears in the organizational 
structure which tends to be flat in the decentralized organization. On the other hand, 
it is tall in the centralized organization. 
There is a major impact on the national economy when different sectors of 
the government are being privatized. This impact on the economy can be assessed 
from two sides: first, allocative efficiency and second, productive efficiency. 
Allocative efficiency,4 is one of the government's objectives to be achieved. 
Although economists can see and determine the level of conflict between income 
and the different ways to distribute it, in most cases governments are trying to 
achieve some goals that do not give any kind of returns in term of cash. One goal of 
4
 Ibid. 3 
the government is to provide jobs for the people and to provide an important service 
for the public. In this case it becomes difficult to achieve allocative efficiency. One 
way to achieve allocative efficiency is to allow competition to exist. This can bring 
attention to what competition in public services can do. 
There are several factors for privatization to be successful. Some of these 
factors include the nature of the product that is being produced, type of services, 
size of the market, government rules and policies that could cause any problems in 
dealing with exporting and importing a product. In case of the domestic market, the 
government should allow competition to exist. 
Productive efficiency, in public sectors, is more likely to be lower than in 
private sectors. There are two reasons that can be related to that issue. First, the 
level of government intervention in private sectors is far less than of the public 
sector. Second, the private sector has better incentives programs and disciplinary 
systems for firing employees, both of which are useful in improving the level of 
work. What supports these two reasons is the competition. The question that arises 
is: "whether or not it is beneficial to privatize." The answer in most cases is, "yes". 
It has been shown and proven by experience that companies which operate under a 
government system have deficiencies in the management of their work force and in 
8 
the bureaucratic system.5 One problem lies in the structure which tends to be 
inherent to centralized decision making economy. 
Some of the objectives that can be generated from privatization are: 
• Developing new marketing strategies. 
• Improving quality of service. 
• Increasing effectiveness. 
• Controlling cost. 
• Achieving higher performance of the airline. 
• Utilizing equipment in the most effective way. 
• Freeing the government to concentrate on its political and strategic issues. 
• Preventing the national capital from emigrating outside the country. 
• Using new ideas that could benefit the economy as a whole. 
• Widening share ownership. 
• Reducing the public sector borrowing requirements. 
These benefits free the government from the great financial burden that is 
involved. Privatization increases efficiency, allows employees to participate in the 
company, increases revenue, increases corporate capital, increases investments, 
5
 Ahmed Galal, Mary Shirley, Does Privatization Deliver, (Washington, D.C: The 
International Bank of Reconstructing, 1994). 
6
 Johan Vickers, George Yarrow, Privatization: an Economic Analysis, (Massachusetts, 
United States: MIT Press, 1989), 157. 
9 
improves marketing and diversification and gives management freedom to right size 
the work force. A downside for privatization is having an increase in the price of 
the service, which may not be true in all cases. Also, lay-offs of worker could affect 
the economy if it severe. 
The government has to define the objectives and assess all the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of privatization. Since it is not possible to do the 
comparison and a case analysis of Saudi Airlines at the current time because 
privatization has not yet taken place, a simulation analysis would be done to 
evaluate the effectiveness of privatization. Prior to the privatization of Saudi 
Arabian Airlines, a comprehensive study of a privatized airlines of the same 
capacity would be carried out. In this research, the author will analyze profitability, 
productivity and performance of SV prior to privatization and provide with some 
prediction for post-privatization. This would be done by performing assimilation on 
SV to what has happened to other airlines that went through the privatization 
process, holding environmental change as a constant. 
Finally, a lot of work needs to be done to change the current situation of the 
company and to improve its financial ability to meet the corporate objectives. In 
order for these changes to occur, a major restructuring program of the entire 
10 
company should take place, and a set of new objectives should be presented to start 
the privatization program. 
11 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem of privatization lies in the process itself and how it is 
implemented. Getting the privatization process to work is not the big issue here, but 
the main problem is making the right decision in the right environment. The right 
decision is to how to sell and to whom to sell. The right environment means 
allocating resources and changing rules and policies to facilitate the airline's 
operations. Another problem that the privatization process has to deal with is the 
financial problems that face the company. Some government sectors owe Saudi a 
lot of money, and these different agencies are not able to pay back the amounts that 
are due, which keeps the airline in debt for a long time. These agencies are the 
Postal Service, Health Department, Department of Higher Education, and some 
other agencies that are not able to pay back the airline for the services they received 
in the past. 
While the difficulties of implementing privatization are numerous, the gains 
are not limited. Difficulties can be characterized as follows: First, the impact of 
political power is one of the most important factors. Second, there are obstacles that 
limit the flow of information, which make the job of managers in a public sector 
company difficult when trying to make the right decision. This directly affects job 
efficiency. Third, the rules and policies imposed will play an important role in 
12 
reducing the efforts toward better services. Specifically needed are contract 
enforcement, legal framework, and a reasonable capital market. 
There are several issues that should be addressed before the privatization 
process takes place. Some of these issues are that Saudi Airlines is providing an 
important service because of its strategic location. It provides the (Haj) service, 
where Pilgrims from all over the world come to Makkah to perform Haj. This is 
very important because of the location of Saudi Arabia which houses the two Holy 
Mosques in Makkah and Midenah. The impact of this would be viewed by other 
Muslim countries as not doing the kind of job that should be done when it comes to 
providing service. Also, Saudia is providing special flight services for government 
uses; this service should be addressed in order to maintain the same quality of 
service after privatization or contract it to a different agency. This is also important 
because government officials are always flying SV for political purposes. 
Some other services that Saudi Airlines is providing are: 
• The mass teacher movements. 
• Contracted cheap labor movement. 
• Fare subsidy in the domestic market. 
• Special flight services for the government officials. 
13 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Previous Research 
The topic of airline privatization has been the center of discussion of some 
experts in the field of privatization, since privatization is now a current issue almost 
everywhere in the world. The World Bank Conference has published a book that 
highlights privatization, Does Privatization Deliver. This book gives an overview 
of the privatization process and how countries around the world are adopting this 
idea, in fact, making it one of the main goals that need to be achieved. Also the 
approach of the privatization process is analyzed. The book is the result of a two-
day conference held by the World Bank in Washington D.C. The objective of the 
conference was to spread out the findings of privatization. 
Many countries around the world have adopted the idea of privatization, and 
now it is a fact around the world. Although it is adopted in some parts of the world, 
there are some people who argue that it is going faster than it should be. Others 
argue about why to privatize, when to privatize, or how to privatize. The findings of 
the conference are striking. The bottom line? Privatization can bring substantial 
gain. Out of the twelve cases presented in the conference, eleven of them had 
positive results after privatization. 
7
 Ibid. 5 
14 
The gain is only achieved if privatization is done the right way. This means 
overhauling government regulation and policy. Furthermore, the findings show that 
privatization may not work well in developed countries because of the uncertainty 
about government easing its policy. Finally the conference concluded that 
government intervention will not disappear overnight in developed countries, poor 
economy does not help privatization achieve its goals. Other countries' experiences, 
such as the United Kingdom and Mexico, are also briefly described. Finally, it 
discusses some of the policy implications that should be adopted. 
Privatization of the Saudi Economy Between The Analysis And The 
o 
Application. This literature discusses the privatization concept in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and the advantages and disadvantages of privatization. The author 
lists some advantages such as achieving better economic growth and widening share 
ownership. Some of the disadvantages are a preliminary price increase of the 
services and lay-off of workers. The author discusses the priority in privatization. 
Furthermore, the author reviews the current situation of the privet sector in Saudi 
Arabia. The author further explains the impact of privatization on the national 
economy of Saudi Arabia as a country; in particular, the privatization of Saudi 
Airlines. Privatization, Toward a More Effective Government is a report presented 
8
 Ibid. 2 
9
 President's Commission Privatization, Privatization Toward More Effective 
r.nvernment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988). 
15 
to President Reagan's Commission on Privatization. The research concentrates on 
privatization worldwide and how this process has accelerated dramatically in the 
past few years. It continues to list some of the countries that established the positive 
view towards privatization. 
Going Private is another research which has dealt with the topic of 
privatization. In this book, the author shows how changes in market structure and 
shares play a vital role in privatization and the strategies of competition within the 
same industry. This book shows how costs and productivity increase with 
privatization. 
Privatizing Airports is literature which discusses the need for privatizing 
airports. The author depicts the need for more capacity in major airports in the U.S. 
Also, the author suggests that airports operated as businesses tend to price their 
services the way other businesses do, with prices varying in accordance with 
demand. Furthermore, the author discusses the issue that when airports are under 
government operation, their system fails to use market price to allocate scarce 
capacity. 
10
 Joes A. Gomez-lbanez, John R. Meyer, Going Private. (Washington, D.C.: The 
Bookings Institution, 1993). 
11
 Robert W. Pool, Jr. Privatizing Airports, (Santa Monica, CA: Reason Foundation, 
1990). 
16 
The author further explains the different forms of privatization. The most 
common forms suggested by Pool are contracting operation of existing airports, 
long-term franchising of a firm of consortium to finance. And building and 
operating a new facility. The last form of privatization is the sale of a government 
enterprise to private owners, to be operated as a private business. 
Privatization in the Developing World12 In the first chapter of the book the 
author gives a brief background of privatization. In this section the author discusses 
the political and economical factors in privatization. The author's view is that any 
decision to privatize it should involve a degree of risk for a government. The 
problems lies in reducing the risk to a politically acceptable level while leaving the 
government in a position to achieve a successful privatization program. From the 
economical prospective, the author states that privatization may also present 
economic risks that translate into political risks for the government. This risk is 
brought out by the fear of losing control of the pace and direction of development, 
especially in the industrial sector. 
Finally, the author states that in order for a privatization program to be 
successful, the government must demonstrate that its decision to privatize 
2
 Ibid. 
17 
any firm is going to be a long-term policy. If potential buyers suspect that there is 
even a remote possibility of renationalization, they will be unwilling to risk capital 
to buy divested industries. 
Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab Countries,I3 a paper 
presented at a seminar held in Abu Dabi, United Arab Emirates, December 5-7, 
1988. The author discusses the issue of liberalization and privatization. The main 
purpose of this section is to examine the principles, practices, and record of the 
deregulation and privatization movements of the 1980s. Macroeconomics' rationale 
for privatization was also discussed. In this section the author states that 
privatization could bring improvement in efficiency of the enterprise. Privatization 
and the regional public joint venture in the Gulf Cooperation Council region (GCC) 
was also discussed by the author. Since its inception in 1981, GCC has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of regional joint ventures as an effective approach to 
foster cooperation and integration of the members. 
The main purpose of the paper is to review the basic characteristic of the 
existing GCC regional joint ventures. Also it investigates the difficulties and 
constraints impeding the privatization efforts of these joint venture enterprises. In 
13
 Said El-Naggar, Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab Countries. 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1993). 
18 
this paper the author seeks the possibilities of developing a policy and institutional 
framework to promote private sector investment in the intra-GCC joint venture. 
Finally, the author mentions the topic of privatization in developing countries 
and in the regional joint ventures context as in need of some additional 
consideration. Also, the author suggests that privatization must be adopted as a 
long-term strategy. Furthermore, the research discusses the main objectives of 
privatization in the GCC region, which is to gradually replace the public sectors' 
investments as the main engine for economic and industrial growth in each member 
state. 
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2.2 Privatization In General View: 
The process of privatization requires a detailed research and in-depth analysis 
on current market situations and demand. Privatization is currently in progress 
around the world. Some of the countries that have adopted privatization are 
Mexico, Chile, Singapore, Sweden, Hungary.14 Many countries have put 
privatization on their priority list. With the need for change and the world's current 
economic condition, privatization is helpful to improve the cash flow of the 
government. It will also rid the government of some of the worries and 
responsibilities carried by aging and inefficient government sectors. 
By clearly defining the governments goals and economic conditions, 
privatization will have most of the answers in some cases, which will help change 
the view of how services should be handled. There are three factors which impact 
how a successful privatization process can be achieved. First, the demand for the 
product or services that are being produced needs to be determined and how 
important they are to the consumers. Second, the competition is the most important 
factor in this process and how privatization deals with it. Third, the environment and 
its effect on the performance of the private sector, such as regulatory systems and 
complex policies imposed on the firms, play a great role. 
14
 Dennis J. Gayle, Jonathan N. Goodrich. Privatization and Deregulation in Global 
Perspective, (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1990). 
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The British privatization program has been widely acclaimed as an economic 
and political success. Billions of pounds have been raised by the selling of several 
SOEs, which has made privatization economically feasible to adopt under the right 
circumstances. This provides evidence to support the view that private sectors are 
more efficient in doing the job. Privatization is mostly observed in markets where 
competition is intense or capital cost is high. The reason is that because of the 
imperfect financial market for the government, high capital cost keeps a lot of 
players out of the market. 
In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the situation is a little different than in other 
countries, such as Britain. With the growing economy, the government is first 
trying to build much stronger and reliable private sectors that will be able to sustain 
the initial financial crisis. Also it is in the process of finding more private sector 
jobs because of the lay-off caused by the government privatization which helps 
stimulate the national economy. There are several factors that will determine 
whether the government of Saudi Arabia should undergo the privatization process. 
These factors comprise the condition of the entity, its feasibility to sell it or not, its 
gains, and how to spin off SEO to eliminate future loss. Second, political power of 
government to control the oil industry as an example of not privatizing this vital 
sector. Oil, the backbone of the Saudi economy, is a revenue source to the 
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government that accounts for approximately 75% of these total revenues. Other 
areas where privatization might work well in Saudi Arabia are the railroad services. 
In addition, the communication sector has high potential to be privatized. The 
government of Saudi Arabia has to conduct an intense study as to which services 
need to be privatized by evaluating both the losses and gains to the government and 
to the public. In addition, they would have to choose the right time and the right 
environment of privatization in order to ensure perfect and complete performance. 
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2.3 Privatizing The Telecommunications Sector: 
Countries around the world are trying to adopt a series of programs that will 
improve communication systems. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the government 
has spent billions of dollars in improving its communication sectors and programs 
for training people to be professional in this field. The reason for increased 
spending is the communication industry has one of the fastest growing technologies 
in the world. The telecommunications sector in Saudi Arabia is combined with the 
postal services, and it is fully owned by the government. To privatize, the 
government is subcontracting maintenance to allow the private sector to join in the 
process of maintaining and developing this vital sector. 
One of the biggest drawbacks is the lack of professional people in top 
management, technical specialties, and consultations. These factors affect the total 
performance of operations in this sector. Also there are some other factors that 
make telecommunications inefficient, such as the absence of competition. The main 
factor that prevents telecommunication from advancing in Saudi Arabia are policies 
and regulations imposed by the government, which affect decision making and the 
redundancy of work. Second, subcontracts that exceed a certain value have to be 
approved by the Treasury Department, which takes quite a bit of time. The third 
problem is the ability to allocate outside financial resources which are restricted in 
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some part because they depend on the government's allocation of budget every year. 
Sometimes these funds are not enough to provide the kind of services that customers 
need. The lack of funds also will not allow the sector to take advantage of 
opportunities that might improve its services. These opportunities are improving 
services by having the newest technology that will serve the customer in the most 
efficient way. Therefore, maximum profitability cannot be achieved in the current 
environment. 
Hence, the total performance of the telecommunication services is very low. 
This is not only characteristic of the Saudi telecommunication sector but also it is 
the same in many other countries' government-operated telecommunication sectors. 
The problem lies in having a limited budget in hiring professionals to maximize the 
facilities. Since financial performance is low, there are several steps that can be 
taken to improve it. First, a plan to better utilize the facilities and the equipment 
that are available should be introduced. Second, costs need to be reduced and 
productivity needs to be improved. Third, a new profitable service that will 
generate revenues for the sector needs to established. Fourth, human resources need 
to be used more efficiently. Fifth, the managerial practices which limit performance 
and cause deficiencies need to be eliminated. 
15
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A complete privatization of this sector will eliminate most of the problems 
that face the communications system today in Saudi Arabia. The lack of allocating 
financial resources and the loss of opportunities will be avoided. There will be a 
marked improvement of services and more revenue will be generated. In general, 
when privatization occurs it increases revenue and higher customer satisfaction can 
be achieved. The customers will be the first to feel the change in services with 
privatization. The most appropriate method to privatize this sector is a gradual or 
step-by-step sell-off of equity on a wider spectrum. The reason for this is to make 
sure that the private sector is doing what benefit the customers. This could be done 
by allowing the private sector to join in owning secondary stations. The main 
communication network could still be operated by the government for security 
reasons. The other way of doing this is to allow the private sector to take care of 
maintaining the facilities and operating a limited range of the services. 
Finally, the organizational structure has to be modified for better 
performance and to allow for much faster services. Therefore, the government has 
to adopt the right organizational structure that will allow for more decentralization 
which, in turn, will allow for more flexibility in accomplishing the job. The new 
changes in the organizational structure should focus on improving service, reducing 
costs, maximizing performance and better utilization of the resources available. 
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Decentralization would allow middle managers to be involved in the decision 
making and give the appropriate feedback. On the contrary, the centralized 
structure tends to make decisions without involving the middle manager in the 
process of the decision making. 
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2.4 Airline Privatization 
The airline industry is one of the most competitive businesses in the world 
due to the rivalry in the market. Intense competition forced many airlines out of the 
market because they lacked the necessary capital for this economical warfare and 
the ability to compete in the free market. It is difficult to stay on top with constantly 
changing environments and fluctuating economic growth. Along with these factors 
that affect airline performance, the fact that they are owned by their governments is 
an even greater burden. Also lack of funds, slow growth, fluctuating economy, 
mismanagement, and the rules and regulations imposed on these airlines make their 
existence a difficult task to accomplish. One of the proposed solutions to overcome 
most of these problems is privatizing the airline industry. The need for 
privatization comes at a time when governments are slowly trying to avoid or 
reduce debt in their budgets; this process will help governments in improving cash 
flow to pay their debts. 
There are countries who have introduced privatization successfully to 
improve profitability and operations. Airline privatization allows these companies 
to compete freely with other carriers, without any restrictions or any rules and 
policies that might hold them back from competing freely The success of some 
airlines is due to the fact that they were privatized by their government. 
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British Airways is one proven example of success among airlines. When the 
divestiture program started in the United Kingdom in 1979, the country was heading 
toward a recession with high unemployment, high inflation and a tight government 
budget. By 1982, the country was beginning a period of moderate growth, low 
inflation, had loosened budget constraints-in part, because of the successful 
privatization program that had been adopted by the government. The reason for this 
success was that the private sectors had the ability to move quicker than when they 
were under government control. Decisions were made without any delay to proceed 
for small tasks. Being able to move faster without any constraint allows the private 
sector to produce more effectively and to be more productive in their business. 
Privatization in Mexico was also a success in general, with the exception of 
some management and economic problems. The government set its objectives for 
privatization and acted toward achieving this goal. The government announced the 
privatization of Aeromexico and Mexicana Airlines. When Mexicana Airlines 
was privatized, the new buyers began a massive investment program to improve the 
status of the airline. This case shows that privatization could be good or bad 
depending on how the new owners set the goals and how the policies are framed by 
the new management to achieve these goals. 
16
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Generally speaking, airline privatization could be the right step toward 
improving performance and profitability. Privatization must be done carefully, and 
in different phases to ensure long-term survival. There are several cases where 
airlines have been privatized with success. Other airlines should benefit from such 
experiences toward successful utilization of the organizational resources. Measures 
should be taken to convert disadvantages of the company to advantages and to turn 
the airline from a cost center to a profit center. 
The situation of Saudi Airlines is similar to British Airways, whose 
performance and production were declining. After the deal with Boeing and Mc-
Donald Douglas for the purchase of new wide body aircrafts, Saudia's fleet capacity 
will be improved tremendously. A massive re-engineering program in Saudia is in 
progress to set new strategies for the future. The airline should be ready to enter a 
higher level competition with other airlines. 
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2.4.1 British Airway* Privatization: 
In the UK, the concept of transferring government activity to private 
enterprise could resolve problem issues for local authorities. It is questioned 
whether people would really prefer to make positive choices rather than leave the 
decision to the local council. The issue is about the level of service that should be 
provided and how the service can be supplied in the most economic and satisfactory 
manner. 
The year 1979 was a decisive breakpoint in the history of public enterprise in 
Britain. Until that year, there was a clear, if erratic, trend in the direction of 
bringing greater numbers of enterprises under public ownership. Since 1979, the 
privatization program has produced a sharp movement in the opposite direction. 
With respect to their past performance, public corporations have been subjected to a 
great deal of criticism. This dissatisfaction has acted as a stimulus to the evolution 
of privatization policies. 
British Airways was not transformed to private ownership until early in 1987, 
following long delays due to a competition lawsuit brought by Laker Airways and 
renegotiation of the Bermuda II Agreement with the United States regarding North 
17
 Brown Rosemary, The Privatization Puzzle. (Management Today, Nov. 1979), 118. 
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Atlantic routes. BA was finally offered for sale on 30 January 1987 at a price of 
125 pence per share, which valued the company at £ 900 million. 
19
 Ibid. 6 
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2.4.2 BRTTTSH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Financial performance of BA in the public sector had been poor for some 
years, but a strong change occurred when Lord King became Chairman in 1981 and 
assembled a new management team. Table 1 shows BA's revenue, expenditure, 
profit, and gross profit margin for the five years before privatization. Table 2 shows 
gross profit and net profit margin. The same data were presented after privatization 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
The 1994-95 financial year was a record for British Airways, which reflects 
the strong continued demand for passengers and freight services against modest 
growth in capacity. Premium passenger traffic was particularly strong, helped by 
the new Club Europe product launched during the year. World Cargo had a very 
good year, with cargo ton kilometers up by 12 percent, as world trade surged to its 
best growth level in two decades. Growth in cargo tons was, in part, due to a 
doubling of leased-in freighters which operated to markets as diverse as Sweden, 
20 
Hong Kong, South Africa and South America. 
20
 British Airways Fact Book 1995. Corporate Communication. 
32 
TABLE 1. BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE BEFORE PRIVATIZATION 
YEAR TO 
31 MARCH 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
REVENUE 
($ BILLIONS) 
3391.2 
3325 
3283.8 
3895.2 
4226 
5483.8 
EXPENDITURE 
($ BILLIONS) 
3103.6 
2916.3 
2906.4 
3610.2 
3953 
5038.9 
NET RESULT 
86.6 
271.8 
206.7 
252.7 
220.8 
258.2 
NET PROFIT 
MARGIN 
0.0255 
0.0817 
0.0629 
0.0648 
0.0522 
0.0470 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report ) 
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TABLE 2. BA'S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AFTER PRIVATIZATION. 
YEAR TO 
31 MARCH 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
REVENUE 
($ BILLIONS) 
6856.7 
7167.7 
8332.4 
8295.4 
9090 
8405 
6602 
7177 
EXPENDITURE 
($ BILLIONS) 
6258.7 
6517.8 
8029.1 
7699 
8491 
7937 
6134 
6559 
NET RESULT 
307.2 
395.9 
174.5 
442.1 
395 
178 
274 
250 
NET PROFIT 
MARGIN 
0.0448 
0.0552 
0.0209 
0.0532 
0.0434 
0.0211 
0.0415 
0.0348 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
FIGURE 3. BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
AFTER PRIVATIZATION 
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FIGURE 4. BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
AFTER PRIVATIZATION 
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Overall services of BA after privatization have improved, and the airline 
became more customer oriented. The fall in profit in 1986-1987 was due largely to 
the reduction in transatlantic traffic in the summer of 1986 following the Chernobyl 
and Libyan incidents. 
21
 Ibid 
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Just before British Airways was privatized in 1984, it enjoyed an operating 
surplus of £ 272 million, up from a £544 million loss in 1981-1982. Its new 
marketing strategy at that time had three main thrusts: 
1. Identifying passengers' requirements and moving to satisfy them. 
2. Becoming more people oriented. 
3. Developing an overall strategy to carry the company forward over the 
next 5-10 years. 
The strategy is shown in its " Putting People First" training program for all BA staff, 
the Super Shuttle Services, and the Super Club Business Class." 
Privatization has brought to Britain one of the most sweeping redistribution 
of property ever seen in any country, short of revolution. With the sale of BA worth 
£900 million of BA, the sum of assets which have been removed from state control 
since 1979 now total over £ 2 billion. Privatization has gained a central place in the 
23 
government's industrial strategy and has acquired a driving momentum of its own. 
Since its privatization, the airline expanded its international routes to cover 
more area than before. Also the airline engaged in a series of alliances that have 
given BA the ability to compete globally. In North America, BA had formed an 
alliance with USAir. In the Pacific it had formed an alliance with Quantas. Some 
22
 Lace Geoffrey, Return Flight For BA, (Marketing, May 1984), 18-23 
23
 Van de Vliet Annita, Mrs. Thatcher's Private Prospects. (Management Today, Mar 
1987), 60-63 
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of these benefits are code sharing, ground handling, and various customer services. 
Good management played a significant part in the privatization of BA, productivity 
has increased, customer service has improved, and overall performance has been 
better than before. 
TABLE 3. BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL RATIOS 
1 Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Revenue 
3391.2 
3325 
3283.8 
3895.2 
4226 
5483.8 
6856.7 
7167.7 
8332.4 
8295 4 
Total Assets 
2488 
2680.2 
2442.2 
2666.9 
3113.1 
5310.1 
6144.5 
6253.2 
7892.7 
9098.1 
Total Asset 
Turnover 
1.363 
1.241 
1.345 
1.461 
1.357 
1.033 
1.116 
1.146 
1.056 
0.912 
(Source: British Airways Annual Reports) 
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FIGURE 5. BRITISH AIRWAYS TOTAL ASSETS TURNOVER BEFORE TURNOVER 
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TABLE 4. BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL RATIOS. 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Revenue 
3283.8 
3895.2 
4226 
5483.8 
6856.7 
7167.7 
8332.4 
8295.4 
9090 
8405 
6602 
7177 
Fixed Assets 
1263 
1247 
1315 
1300 
2165 
2467 
2464 
4340 
4682 
5989 
6406 
6634 
Fixed Asset 
Turnover 
2.6 
3.12 
3.21 
4.22 
3.17 
2.91 
3.38 
1.91 
1.94 
1.40 
1.03 
1.08 
(Source: British Airways Annual Reports) 
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FIGURE 6. BRITISH AIRWAYS TOTAL ASSETS TURNOVER 
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2.4.3 EMPLOYEES PRODUCTIVITY 
The motivation and commitment of all employees continue to play a major 
part in the success of British Airways. This is rewarded through the airline*s Profit 
Share Scheme in 1995 which gave eligible employee a bonus equivalent to 3.07 
weeks basic pay. This bonus can be used by employees to acquire shares in the 
company or can be taken in cash. 
In the last financial year, the average number of employees increased by 
three percent to 53,060. Of these, 43,929 were employed in the United Kingdom 
and 9,131 overseas. Productivity measured in available ton kilometers per 
employee was up by just over three percent. Table 5 shows the productivity of 
British Airways before privatization and Tale 6 represents productivity after 
privatization. Each table is presented in Figure 7 and 8. 
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FIGURE 7. BRITISH AIRWAYS EMPLOYEES PRODUCTIVITY 
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FIGURE 8. BRITISH AIRWAYS EMPLOYEES PRODUCTIVITY 
AFTER PRIVATIZATION 
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FIGURE 9. BRITISH AIRWAYS PRODUCTIVITY 
1977-1995 
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2A4 BRITTSH ATRWAYS OPERATIONAL DATA 
British Airways operational data such as Available Seat Kilometers (ASKs), 
Available Tonne Kilometers (ATKs), and Revenue Passengers Kilometers (RPKs) 
are presented in Table 5 between 1977 and 1995. Figures 10 and 11 show 
operational for ASKs, ATKs, and RPKs. Table 6 shows BA load factor, weight 
load factor, revenue ton carried, employee, and fleet number. This data shows the 
impact of privatization and the effect of the globalization strategy on BA 
performance. 
With a growing demand for air travel, BA is trying to achieve a leading share 
of air travel business worldwide with a significant presence in all major 
geographical markets. 
British Airways carried a record number of passengers (35 million) and had 
its best ever load factor of 71.6% in 1995. Premium travel reached a record high, 
with improved economic performance in most of the airline's major markets helping 
to increase premium demand by nine percent compared with six percent in the main 
cabin of the aircraft. British Airways is the world's largest international passenger 
airline with some 24 million people carried on international scheduled services in 
1994, 6.5 million more than its nearest rival. It was also the seventh largest 
46 
international cargo airline in the world in 1994 and the only airline in IATA's top 
ten cargo airlines without a dedicated freighter fleets4 
British Airways Fact Book, 1995. 
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TABLE 5. BRITISH AIRWAYS OPERATIONAL RESULT 
TOTAL SCHEDULED SERVICES 1977-1995 
YEAR 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
ASKs 
47811046 
55580721 
60861588 
64323912 
59279615 
55328203 
53361070 
55369604 
59812558 
61134627 
64352950 
82911466 
85034980 
93192295 
90908324 
102023168 
H4496940 
116974000 
122063000 
A T K s | 
6193346 
7021073 
7600691 
7929614 
7333783 
6827102 
6631316 
7109057 
7746012 
7989453 
8438851 
11320044 
11750684 
13008504 
12865477 
14156749 
15831598 
16240000 
17201000 
RPKs 
28881559 
35405771 
41082463 
40140169 
39047814 
37277686 
34442693 
34206000 
41102652 
40429976 
46299426 
56939495 
60757570 
66794988 
62834832 
72491372 
80083721 
81907000 
87395000 
(Source: IATA ANNUAL REPORTS) 
TABLE 6. BRITISH AIRWAYS OPERATIONAL RESULT 
TOTAL SCHEDULED SERVICES 1977-1995 
YEAR 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
PAX L.F% 
60.40 
63.70 
67.50 
62.50 
65.90 
67.40 
64.70 
67.00 
68.60 
66.10 
71.80 
68.70 
71.10 
71.70 
69.10 
71.10 
69.90 
70.00 
71.60 
W. L.F 
58.3 
60.00 
64.90 
60.20 
62.80 
63.10 
62.70 
64.90 
64.30 
62.80 
67.40 
64.70 
66.50 
65.10 
62.70 
63.70 
63.70 
66.50 
67.80 
R T C 
3612618 
4213689 
4930199 
4771279 
4604933 
4310184 
4160987 
4612403 
5053481 
5047905 
5740198 
7328331 
7811111 
8468500 
8280811 
9397557 
10077460 
10792000 
11667000 
EMPLOYEE 
52433 
54645 
54922 
51955 
45079 
37954 
33990 
36189 
37955 
42271 
39684 
48656 
50959 
53615 
47181 
47025 
47642 
49628 
53060 
FLEET 
168 
172 
181 
176 
162 
138 
137 
139 
136 
149 
151 
199 
211 
228 
226 
226 
226 
253 
283 
(Source: IATA ANNUAL REPORTS) 
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FIGURE 10. BRITISH AIRWAYS L.F & WEIGHT L.F 1977-1995 
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FIGURE 11. BRITISH AIRWAYS OPERATION 
RESULT 1977-1995 
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FIGURE 12. BRITISH AIRWAYS OPERATIONS TOTAL 
SCHEDULED SERVICES 1977-1995 
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FIGURE 13. BRITISH AIRWAYS FLEET 1977-1995 
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FIGURE 14. BRITISH AIRWAYS EMPLOYEE 1977-1995 
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2.4.5 Model Specification 
The regression model was applied to British Airways data. The next step 
was to do a forecast analysis for the upcoming years. Using the data from the 
regression analysis, we can predict what will probably happen to the airlines within 
the next five to eight years. 
2.4.6 Data Collection 
All the data needed to perform the regression analysis were gathered from 
either the IATA Annual Report or British Airways Annual Report. RPKs, ASKs, 
ATKs, passengers carried, fleet, employee, and aircraft number were collected from 
IATA Annual Report. Data that concerns financial information were collected from 
ICAO Annual Report and British Airways Annual Report. The data were collected 
from 1977-1995 and segmented to operational data and financial data. 
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2.4.7 LANCHILE fl.INF.A AEREA NACIONAL1 
Table 7 presents LANCHILE operational and financial data. The 
regression analysis output will be included in Chapter 4. LANCHILE was 
privatized in 1989. 
TABLE 7. LANCHILE AIRLINE OPERATIONAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
ASKs 
2194253 
2620620 
2339391 
1803008 
1854791 
2094776 
2307367 
2425974 
2754216 
2929605 
3340004 
3066706 
ATKs 
401800 
454719 
398960 
325350 
320817 
344030 
378315 
441174 
510040 
585974 
654495 
636123 
RPKs 
1403490 
1657942 
1308321 
1048058 
1096705 
1280029 
1478794 
1546985 
1760837 
2011604 
2113614 
1910649 
(Source: IATA, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 15. LANCHILE OPERATIONAL DATA 
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TABLE 8. LANCHILE AIRLINE OPERATIONAL DATA. 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
PAX. L.F 
63.9 
63.3 
55.9 
58.1 
59.1 
61.1 
64.1 
63.8 
63.9 
68.7 
63.3 
62.3 
EMPLOYEE 
1551 
1423 
1487 
1372 
1046 
851 
1013 
1028 
1261 
1512 
1743 
1794 
FLEET 
8 
9 
8 
8 
8 
7 
8 
9 
11 
12 
15 
13 
(Source: IATA, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 16. LANCHILE PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR 
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TABLE 9. LANCHILE FINANCIAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
REVENUE 
85.6 
115.6 
138.6 
98.9 
115.9 
126.3 
144.9 
156.6 
183.0 
213.1 
243.4 
261.1 
EXPENDITURE 
120.9 
129.2 
157.3 
119.7 
114.4 
125.0 
138.3 
151.0 
179.0 
210.5 
258.7 
249.0 
NET RESULT 
-10.7 
-7.5 
-30.3 
-36.5 
-19.1 
0.70 
5.9 
4.1 
4.9 
6.4 
-8.5 
3.5 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 17. LANCHILE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
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2.4.8 AEROLINEAS ARGENTINES 
In February 1987, the Minister of Public Works, Rodolfo Terregno, 
made the first attempt toward a privatization program. He had found a 
purchaser for 40% of Argentina's state airline, Aerolineas Argentines (AA). 
He had won public opinion and executive branch support, but privatization 
was not possible without congressional approval which he did not win.25 
Menem administration is trying to reform and shrink Argentina's 
bloated public sector by embracing privatization, offering to transfer 
government companies and services into private hands, domestic and 
foreign. Menem took the first step by partially privatizing Argentina's 
flagship air carrier in 1990/ 
In 1992, Iberia acquired 30% of Aerolineas Argentines. The 
principle objective is to dominate the air traffic between Europe and South 
America in collaboration with its associated airlines. Despite the effort to 
make the airline profitable, the airline's overall performance is still low. 
The reasons behind that are as follows: high fuel costs, the entrance of new 
privately-owned carriers such as Lineas Acreas Privadas Argentina 
25
 Staubu, Janette, Argentina: Would The Peronists Consider Privatization?. 
(Multinational Business, 1989). 
26
 Lima, Edvaldo Pereira, South America? Yes! (Industry Week, 1991) 
(LAPA). LAPA uses South West style by operating only six 737-200, all 
economy configuration. Also their prices are 40% lower than Aerolineas 
11 
Argentina. Table 10 shows Argentina Airlines' operational result. 
TABLE 10. AERLOINEAS ARGENTINA OPERATIONAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
ATKs 
1554119 
1588697 
1417993 
1386259 
1320723 
1432821 
1363462 
1491265 
1434620 
1536908 
1671053 
1683699 
1800179 
PRKs 
6926788 
6132471 
5148958 
5079921 
5628120 
6284832 
6653993 
7347713 
7730081 
8254170 
8431987 
8077800 
8988845 
ASKs 
11256951 
11813384 
10666755 
10597238 
10981735 
11221824 
10685100 
12021056 
12030024 
12892652 
13121332 
13161200 
14124118 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
Pollack, John, Iberia Eyes America (Advertising Age, 1992). 
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FIGURE 18. AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
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TABLE 11. AERLOINEAS ARGENTINA OPERATIONAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
PAX L.F 
61.5 
51.9 
48.3 
47.9 
60.8 
56.8 
62.3 
61.1 
64.3 
64.0 
64.3 
61.4 
63.6 
EMPLOYEE 
10096 
9981 
9835 
9822 
10303 
10276 
10323 
10351 
10372 
10791 
9482 
8441 
9811 
FLEET 
34 
35 
35 
32 
32 
32 
32 
31 
30 
31 
29 
29 
35 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 19. AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR 
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TABLE 12. AERLOINEAS ARGENTINA FINANCIAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
REVENUE 
904.7 
875.7 
717.3 
817.7 
627.3 
516.6 
477.2 
516.7 
766.7 
684 
514.7 
740.3 
914.3 
EXPENDITURE 
889.8 
862.7 
825.5 
959.7 
651.7 
533.9 
494.4 
491.7 
723.9 
653.6 
525.1 
712.0 
947 4 
NET RESULT 
12.2 
9.8 
4.9 
-524.7 
-4.5 
-9.7 
-7.2 
10.8 
23.9 
24.6 
-8.1 
14.1 
-188.7 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 20. AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
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2 A 9 A i r N e w Z e ^ n H 
In 1987, New Zealand announced a privatization program designed 
for selling $8.6 billion of government assets to the private sector by 1992. 
In December 1988 state-owned Air New Zealand was sold to a consortium 
of Quantes (19.9%), American Airlines and Japan Airlines (7.5%) each, and 
Brierly investment Ltd. (6.5%). Of the latter, 30% was subsequently sold 
partially to Air New Zealand staff and partly in a public share float at $1.6 a 
share. 
When Air New Zealand operated as a private company for the first 
time, the management was pushing its expansion plans while reorganizing 
and trimming cost. Also the airline has negotiated agreements with other 
competing airlines. These agreements would allow American, Japanese and 
Canadian carriers to buy a block of seats on Air New Zealand flights and 
market them with their own flight numbers. A step was taken by the 
management to reduce workers and re-engineer the organization structure in 
order to increase productivity. The following tables will show operational 
and financial data for Air New Zealand. 
28
 James, Colin, Out of Control: New Zealand Investigates Foreign Role in 
Airlines, (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1991) 
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TABLE 13. AIR NEW ZEALAND OPERATIONAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
ATKs 
1067188 
1150987 
1229346 
1328021 
1350349 
1422159 
1666381 
1779834 
1993288 
2045815 
2321657 
2580126 
2362731 
RPKs 
5663803 
5676643 
5846749 
6440587 
7110304 
7814637 
8731876 
9562934 
10728939 
10096835 
10602846 
10625327 
11885671 
ASKs 
8277599 
8846351 
9324747 
10046267 
10417803 
11000039 
12773965 
13614797 
15316471 
15041242 
16475019 
17358051 
i 17589331 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 21. AIR NEW ZEALAND OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
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TABLE 14. AIR NEW ZEALAND OPERATIONAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
PAX L.F 
68.4 
64.2 
62.7 
64.1 
68.3 
71.0 
68.4 
70.2 
70 
67.1 
64.4 
61.2 
67.6 
EMPLOYEE 
8823 
8300 
6980 
6864 
7020 
7290 
7820 
8229 
8668 
9419 
8057 
7883 
7498 
FLEET 
34 
35 
30 
31 
31 
33 
34 
34 
36 
40 
32 
28 
29 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 22. AIR NEW ZEALAND PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR 
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TABLE 15. AIR NEW ZEALAND FINANCIAL DATA 
YEAR 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
REVENUE 
531.3 
490.0 
557.7 
587.7 
588.6 
661.3 
611.2 
876.1 
1011.0 
1016.0 
658.0 
593.9 
1219.3 
EXPENDITURE 
556.6 
521.7 
567.2 
521.2 
501.5 
594.3 
560.8 
835.0 
962.8 
993.6 
580.9 
558.19 
1113.2 
NET RESULT 
-29.3 
-28.5 
-10.3 
67.4 
68.9 
95.2 
87 
39.4 
42.3 
48 
18.0 
30.5 
63.5 
(Source: ICAO, Annual Report) 
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2,5 Airport Privatiyafinn 
Air traffic in the United States has increased tremendously since the 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The hub-and-spoke system has helped 
the airlines to increase their load factor in some route segments. This 
resulted in airlines reducing their operating cost. Table 11 indicates eight 
major carriers which were chosen to represent the change after deregulation 
29 
in the routes served. 
TABLE 16 NUMBER OF ROUTES (OUT OF TOP 1000 MOST HEAVILY 
TRAVELED ROUTES) SERVICED BY AIRLINE 
Airline 1978 1983 
American 211 934 
Continental 73 106 
Delta 313 470 
Eastern 307 357 
Northwest 78 184 
TWA 173 204 
United 255 452 
USAir _ 173 275 
(Source Data Bank IA, U S Department of Transportation) 
With this, the number of people and the number of flights increased due to 
reduced fares and increased flight frequencies. Airlines are serving more 
destinations than ever before, and foreign airlines' presence in the U.S. skies 
29
 William N.Evans, Structure, conduct, and Performance in the Deregulated 
y.-imp industry. 1991. 
1988 
692 
503 
651 
349 
427 
341 
544 
418 
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has increased through mergers and strategic alliances such as code sharing. 
The major U.S. airports have encountered many problems from this 
increase in airline traffic. Also some other factors have made the situation 
for these airports more difficult. 
There are some problems facing major airports in the U.S. including 
delays, congestion and safety levels. The main reason behind this problem 
of congestion and delay is the hub-and-spoke system, which plays an 
important role in this case. Major carriers operating from a major hub and 
providing services in these airports hold almost a monopoly at the hub 
airport. The problem arises when one or two major airlines dominate a 
certain hub. The drawback of this system is evident when the number of 
gates is less than the number of aircraft scheduled to be using these gates. It 
makes it almost impossible for other airlines to get in and to serve that same 
market. This is strictly a decision by the dominant commercial carrier to 
protect its market and to prevent any new entrants from competing with 
them. 
There is a huge demand for gates in major airports around the U.S. 
It is the responsibility of the government to change some of the rules and 
policies imposed on airports. The most logical solution to this problem is to 
76 
allow the airlines to compete under a new and different free environment to 
meet the market demand. This can be achieved by privatizing airports. By 
doing so, the government would have finished its uncompleted job of total 
deregulation of the airline industry. Since the market decides the rules and 
regulations that will be suitable for their services, the formation of a new 
organization managed by all airport owners will be introduced. It will set 
the new rules and policies with which all other airports and airlines have to 
work. Also on the level of safety, there will be a new set of rules that will 
be present, and some of the old ones will be eliminated. An example of that 
is a big budget which would be allocated for advertising about safety, 
allowing the public to know how safe their airline is. Also insurance 
companies will play stricter roles on safety issues. The old bureaucratic 
system will be replaced by a more dynamic system that will deal with 
solving problems at a much faster pace. There will be substantial progress 
after airports are privatized. 
There are several ways through which these airports can be 
privatized. The government may allow private investors to run the 
maintenance and operation of the airports. This is one way to test the 
ability of public enterprise to manage and make the appropriate decisions. 
77 
Another form of privatization is selling the airports to private 
companies, as was done in case of the British Airport Authority (BAA), 
which was designated for privatization of England's airports. This step will 
allow more capital investment, better utilization of land and equipment, 
increased availability of resources and use of human resources more 
effectively. 
78 
2.5.1 British Airport Authority Privatization 
British Airport Authority (BAA) was privatized in July-1987. Its 
privatization has nothing to do with competition. It is about the transfer of 
valuable assets such as runways, terminals, car Parking, and shopping 
facilities to private hands.30 
The British government policy behind the privatization of BAA is 
to meet the fast-growing demand of the airline industry. In order to meet 
demand of air travel, airports must be able to have enough capacity to 
achieve maximum utilization. Airport capacity is determined by two 
principles: the capacity of the airport terminals to handle passenger 
movement, and the capacity of the runways to handle the aircraft 
movements. The government mission is almost complete after the 
privatization of British Airways. Table 11 shows BAA Traffic Statistics. 
30
 Ibid. 6 
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TABLE 17. BAA TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
YEAR 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
PAX. CARRIED(M) 
40.6 
44 
43.3 
43.7 
44.1 
46.5 
51.6 
53.4 
56 
63.7 
68 
71.3 
72 
72 
77.7 
82 
87.7 
AIR TRANSPORT 
MOVEMENT 
512 
555 
550 
537 
559 
580 
603 
619 
626 
680 
715 
766 
791 
815 
847 
871 
895 
CARGO & MAIL 
(000s) 
729 
737 
707 
699 
685 
746 
839 
835 
864 
951 
1021 
1090 
1082 
1079 
1156 
1305 
1480 
(Source: BAA Annual Report) 
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TABLE 18. BAA FINANCIAL RESULT 
YEAR 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
REVENUE 
162.2 
191.4 
254 
277 
283.7 
316 
362 
396 
439 
523 
641 
747 
834 
903 
952 
1098 
1159 
EXPENDITURE 
131.6 
156.3 
216.1 
237.8 
245.1 
264.6 
289.6 
309 
343 
379 
443 
491 
503 
661 
628 
730 
758 
PROFIT AFTER TAX 
15.6 
23 
18.3 
22.4 
21 
17.6 
24.9 
40 
40 
78 
92 
205 
129 
153 
211 
240 
279 
(Source: BAA Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 23. BAA OPERATING RESULTS 
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FIGURE 24 BAA CARGO AND MAIL CARRIED 
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FIGURE 25. BAA AIR TRANSPORT MOVEMENT 
(Source: BAA, Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 26. BAA PASSENGERS CARRIED 1979-1995 
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FIGURE 27. BAA GROWTH FORECAST 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
BAA-GROWTH AND FORECASTED GROWTH 
FORECASTED 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
(Source: BAA, Annual Report) 
86 
2.6 SUMMARY OF T ITER ATI JRE REVIEW 
The approach used in this literature review begins with an overview 
of previous research that dealt with the same topic. Different perspectives 
were discussed in this paper; also, a general view of the airline industry 
under the suggested proposal of privatization was discussed. The literature 
review searches and analyzes other sectors of the government that could be 
privatized. Moreover, the privatization of the airline industry along with 
airport privatization is analyzed in the form of productivity, profitability, 
and performance. In general, all aspects of privatization that deal with the 
airline industry are mentioned in the report. In particular, the possibility of 
a privatization program for Saudi Arabian Airlines is discussed and 
analyzed. Recommendations will be presented in the paper on various 
parts, such as the financial standing and productivity of the company. 
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3.0 Research Methods 
3.1 Study Area 
The central point of this research is to study the possibility of 
privatizing Saudi Arabian Airlines and the factors that need to be 
considered in this privatization. Saudi Airlines has been in service for fifty 
years; during this time it was, and still is, under full government control. 
This paper coincides with the time when the airline is under a complete 
restructuring program that will prepare it for privatization. A recent deal 
has been announced by the Saudi government to purchase new aircraft from 
the U.S. The deal is worth $7 billion and about 70 new planes are going to 
be added to Saudi Airlines" fleet of 113 aircraft, currently the largest 
civilian fleet in the Middle East. 
There are several options that the government is currently studying 
for making its final decision. The focus of this paper is the manner such a 
process could take place, outlining possible alternatives and what actions 
must be taken by the government to ensure a successful process of 
privatization. Also, there are analyses of the kind of environment in which 
the airline would be working. The goals and the objectives of the 
privatization should be presented clearly to the public before privatization 
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takes place. More research analysis and consulting should be done to allow 
the government to make the right decision. The goal of a private operator is 
clear and that goal is to make profit. The role of the government is very 
important in this vital process; it must help and assist in any possible way to 
assure a successful privatization. 
One way of doing this is to first allow for a partial ownership of the 
company by the public; as the situation improves, the government's role 
will be reduced until the private sector has the complete ability of steering 
the airline toward the desired path. 
One method that is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
privatization is regression analysis of the airline. This regression analysis 
will determine Saudi Airlines' past performance and how it stood out for 
the past few years. In addition to performance, other factors could be 
distinguished such as profitability and total revenues. Also a comparative 
analysis with other Arab carriers will be used to distinguish Saudi Airlines 
between them. 
In this study, I analyze Saudi labor productivity, capital productivity, 
performance, number of employees, number of aircraft, and number of 
passengers carried before privatization, and project it after privatization 
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takes place. This thesis may provide several scenarios with which airlines 
may deal and any corrective action that could be taken to correct it before 
the process starts. 
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3.2 Limitation of the Research 
This analysis will not reflect exactly to what will be the situation 
after the privatization. This is due to several reasons. First, there is no 
available data to the public because the airline is government owned. 
Second, the decision regarding the privatization process is not revealed to 
the public. The reason for that is because privatization still in its early 
stages. Third, environmental changes that could play a part in altering the 
targeted objectives have not yet been revealed. 
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3.3 ARAB CARRIERS ORGANIZATION 
Arab Air Carriers Organization (AACO) started in early 1946 with only 
four members. Those members are Middle East Airlines, Saudi Arabian Airlines, 
Egypt Air, and Sudan Airlines. At that time, the carriers were covering a small 
area and their operation was limited. Some of their weekly flights at that time 
were not scheduled. 
In the early fifties, air transportation in the Middle East experienced a 
growth, and by the sixties more and more Arab carriers were being founded and 
joining the association. By August 8, 1965, Arab Air Carriers Organization was 
formally organized. The purpose of this section is to compare SV to other Arab air 
carriers, and to show where SV stands among regional competitors. Tables 22 
through 31 represent operational data for SV compared to arab carriers. 
3,3.1 Objectives of The AACO 
• AACO is an independent association which gather about all the Arab carriers. 
• Coordinates efforts between member carriers of the association. 
• Represents the Arab carriers members in international events. 
• It is an economic system which seeks to provide the best possible services to all 
travelers. 
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3.3.2 Fnnrtions of The AACO 
Internal Funrtin^ 
1. Data Center 
* Providing statistical reports. 
2. Media 
* Arab Wing Magazine. 
* Communication with the Media. 
* Communication with IATA members. 
3. Flight Operation 
* Training. 
* Shared training. 
External Function 
1. Arab Affair 
* Coordinating efforts with the Arab Ministers of Transportation. 
* Coordinates efforts with the Arab Civil Aviation. 
* And establish relations with other area regional organization. 
2. International Affair 
* Coordinates efforts with other International organization. 
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TABLE 19. ARAB AIR CARRIERS YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 
AIRLINE 
CODES 
SV 
GF 
AH 
MS 
AT 
LN 
ME 
RJ 
EK 
KU 
RB 
IA 
IY 
SD 
TL 
DY 
AIRLINE 
SAUDI ARABIAN ALIENS 
GULF AIRLINES 
AIR ALGERIA 
EGYPT AIR 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 
MEDDLE EAST AIRLINES 
ROYAL JORDANIAN 
EMIRATES 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES 
IRAQ AIRWAYS 
YEMENIA AIRWAYS 
SUDAN AIRWAYS 
TRANS-MIDITERRANEAN AIRWAYS 
ALYEMDA-YEMEN AIRLINES 
YEAR OF 
ESTABLISHING 
1945 
1950 
1953 
1932 
1957 
1964 
1945 
1963 
1985 
1954 
1961 
1945 
1962 
1946 
1953 
1971 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT) 
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TABLE 20. AACO MEMBER'S AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 1994 31 
Revenue Flights 
Scheduled Services 
Kilometers Fiown(OOO) 
Aircraft Departure (number) 
Hours Flown 
Passengers Carried 
(number) 
Freight Tonnes Carried 
Passenger Kilo-Flown (000) 
Available Seat-Kilometer 
Passenger Load Factor (%) 
Tonne-kilo-Performed Pax 
Freight Including (express) 
Mail 
Total 
Available Tonne-Kilo (000) 
Weight Load Factor (%) 
Int' 
427*071 
233700 
640377 
20760194 
650234 
53734046 
86637806 
62.02 
4861902 
2463863 
60330 
7386095 
13768567 
53.64 
Domestic 
"89292 
160922 
193793 
13712879 
90428 
8806888 
13581302 
64.87 
793669 
102289 
5226 
901184 
1878649 
47.97 
TotaI-94 
516363 
384622 
834170 
34473073 
740662 
62543934 
100219108 
62.41 
5655571 
2566152 
65556 
8287279 
15647216 
52.96 
TotaI-93 
488197 
373196 
788551 
33315425 
670986 
59356313 
94086841 
63.09 
5361748 
2209324 
67126 
7638198 
14419549 
52.97 
% Change 
5.7% 
3.1 
5.8 
3.5 
20.4 
5.4 
5.5 
-0.68pts 
5.5 
16.2 
-2.3 
8.5 
8.5 
-O.Olpts 
Charter Services 
Kilometers Flown(OOO) 
Aircraft Departure(number) 
Hours Flown 
Passengers Carried(number) 
Freight Tonnes Carried 
Passenger Kilo-Flown (000) 
Available Seat-Kilometer 
Tonne-kilo performed(OOO) 
Available Tonne-Kilo(OOO) 
43907 
26337 
71709 
2475370 
22859 
4499192 
6360891 
454264 
1032246 
4523 
6790 
8779 
315495 
4065 
216497 
415608 
21983 
69650 
4830 
33127 
80488 
2790865 
26924 
4715689 
6776499 
476247 
1101896 
42232 
30239 
70508 
2376533 
27105 
4043738 
6201471 
414277 
964875 
14.7 
9.6 
14.2 
17.4 
-0.7 
16.6 
9.3 
15.0 
14.2 
Total Services 
Kilometers Flown(OOO) 
Aircraft Departure(number) 
Hours Flown 
Passengers Carried(number) 
Freight Tonnes Carried 
Passenger Kilo-Flown (000) 
Available Seat-Kilometer 
Tonne-kilo performed(OOO) 
Available Tonne-Kilo(OOO) 
470978 
250037 
712086 
23235564 
673093 
58233238 
92998697 
7840359 
14800813 
93815 
167712 
202572 
14028374 
94493 
9026385 
13996910 
923167 
1948299 
564793 
417749 
914658 
37263938 
767586 
67259623 
106995607 
8763526 
16749112 
530529 
403435 
859059 
35691958 
698091 
63400051 
100288312 
8052475 
15384524 
6.5 
3.5 
6.5 
4.4 
10.0 
6.1 
6.7 
8.8 
8.9 
31
 (Source: AACO, Industry Affairs Department) 
95 
TABLE 21. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES- OPERATIONS 199432 
Revenue Flights 
Scheduled Services 
Kilometers Flown(OOO) 
Aircraft Departure(number) 
Hours Flown 
Passengers Carried(number) 
Freight Tonne Carried 
Passenger Kilo-Flown (000) 
Available Seat-Kilometer 
Passenger Load Factor (%) 
Tonne-kilo-Performed Pax 
Freight Including (express) 
Mail 
Total 
Available Tonne-Kilo (000) 
Weight Load Factor (%) 
inr 
66166 
23858 
91516 
3683782 
154466 
12214674 
20122272 
60.70 
1099321 
741575 
20959 
1861855 
3678752 
50.6 
Domestic 
50586 
78674 
99270 
8238113 
61165 
6035296 
9429844 
64.0 
543176 
67954 
4190 
615320 
1370778 
44.9 
Total-94 
116752 
102532 
190786 
11921895 
215631 
18249970 
29552116 
61.80 
1642497 
809529 
25149 
2477175 
5049530 
49.1 
Total-93 
113523 
100044 
185845 
11864339 
195833 
18571801 
2924646 
63 09 
167462 
718316 
25596 
2415374 
4850241 
49.8 
% Chang 
2.8% 
2.5 
27 
0.5 
10.1 
-1.7 
1.0 
-1 70pts 
-1 70 
12.7 
-1.70 
2.6 
4.1 
-0.7pts 
Charter Services 
Kilometers Flown(OOO) 
Aircraft Departure(number) 
Hours Flown 
Passengers Carried(number) 
Freight Tonne Carried 
Passenger Kilo-Flown (000) 
Available Seat-Kilometer 
9680 
3786 
13919 
422194 
7023 
1012785 
2613424 
2864 
3850 
5368 
109316 
163 
83070 
291240 
12544 
7636 
19287 
531510 
7186 
1095855 
2904664 
11233 
6912 
17442 
486483 
4839 
967930 
2569447 
11.7 
10.5 
10.6 
93 
48.5 
13.2 
13.0 
Tonne-kilo performed(OOO) 116108 7750 123858 105353 17.6 
Available Tonne-Kilo(OOO) 409153 41015 450168 389928 15.4 
Total Services 
Kilometers Flown(OOO) 
Aircraft Departure(number) 
Hours Flown 
Passengers Carried(number) 
Freight Tonnes Carried 
Passenger Kilo-Flown (000) 
Available Seat-Kilometer 
Tonne-kilo performed(OOO) 
Available Tonne-Kilo(OOO) 
75846 
27644 
105435 
4105976 
13227459 
13227459 
22735696 
1977963 
4087905 
53450 
82524 
104638 
8347429 
6118366 
6118366 
9721084 
623070 
1411793 
129296 
110168 
210073 
12453405 
19345825 
19345825 
32456780 
2601033 
5499698 
124756 
106956 
203287 
12350822 
19539731 
19539731 
31815911 
2520727 
5240169 
3.6 
3.0 
3.3 
0.8 
11.0 
-1.0 
20 
3.2 
5.0 
32
 (SOURCE: AACO, Industry Affairs Department. 1994) 
TABLE 22. GRAND TOTAL EMPLOYEE 
I'U'S'FK^-1-
24112 
15256 
8952 
6449 
6990 
6431 
5820 
Igj ; 
188 ~~"~ 
(61) 
260 
(286) 
516 
725 
326 
0.8 
(0.4) 
3.0 
(4.2) 
8.0 
12.7 
5.9 
SAUDJA 23924 
EGYPT AIR 15317 
AIR ALGERIA 8692 
LIBYAN ARAB 6735 
TUNIS AIR 6474 
GULF AIR 5706 
KUWAIT 5494 
AIRWAYS 
ROYAL AIR 5481 5404 (77) (1.4) 
MAROC 
.. M E A 4399 4271 (128) (2.9) 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 4285 4285 0 0 
SYRIAN ARAB 3940 4131 194 4.9 
EMIRATES 3421 3973 552 16.1 
SUDAN AIR 2571 2649 78 3.0 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 2286 2286 0 0.0 
ALYBMEK 1480 1392 (88) (5.9) 
T M A 691 690 (1) (0.1) 
TOTAL 105,692 108,063 2,371 2.2 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIER ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
FIGURES OF IA (IRAQ AIRWAYS) ARE FOR 1991 
FIGURES OF IY( YEMENIA AIRWAYS) ARE FOR 1993. 
33
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TABLE 23. PRODUCTIVITY PER EMPLOYEE34 
""HS^ F' M ^^fl 
EMIRATES 
GULF AIR 
R/JGRDAMIAN 
T M A 
SAUDIA 
KUWAIT 
AIRWAYS 
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 
M B A 
EGYPT AIR 
TUNIS AIR 
SUDAN AIR 
ALYEMEN 
AIR ALGERIA 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
SYRIAN ARAB 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
LIBYAN ARAB 
TOTAL 
!;"'77 ","."" *""""" V"j 
368.6 
349.1 
239.0 
234.1 
219.0 
209.0 
174.4 
93.7 
93.6 
83.0 
77.9 
69.5 
59.3 
[58.5] 
52.7 
165.8 
fpfipjf t; "t"-J W^A'^S' 
359.9 
378.8 
233.5 
268.8 
228.1 
228.0 
175.1 
103.5 
108.1 
86.1 
75.2 
58.9 
56.1 
N/A 
54.0 
175.5 
""ItlMEW"™" 
(8.8) 
29.7 
(5.4) 
34.7 
9.1 
19.0 
0.8 
9.8 
14.4 
3.1 
(2.8) 
(10.6) 
(3.1) 
N/A 
1.3 
9.8 
H i m •<• %y w.'. :<, n n '• 
(2.4) 
8.5 
(2.3) 
14.8 
4.1 
9.1 
0.5 
10.4 
15.4 
3.8 
(3.6) 
(15.3) 
(5.3) 
N/A 
2.5 
5.9 
34
 IN THOUSANDS IN TOTAL (SCHED. & UNSCHED.) AVAILABLE TONNE-KMS OF 14 
ARAB AIR CARRIERS 1993 & 1994 COMPARED 
TABLE 24. INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED PASSENGERS 
*•::$$'" 1 g *| f § KJiMv-;:;:':'::-:::->::::::i:i:::?i: 
SAUDIA 
GULF AIR 
EMIRATES 
EGYPT AIR 
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 
AIR ALGERIA 
KUWAIT 
AIRWAYS 
TUNIS AIR 
R/JORDAMAN 
y E A 
SYRIAN ARAB 
SUDAN AIR 
ALYEMEN 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
T M A 
LIBYAN ARAB 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
HI U K - •  H 
3800452 
3484437 
1856330 
1835748 
1774837 
1643297 
1553757 
1345012 
1145289 
677440 
436040 
225009 
165191 
0 
19,942,839 
; ' '^Wli '•'.'.'.'.'.&• 
3683782 
3755741 
2197068 
2238726 
1787648 
1310430 
1756191 
1390772 
1169808 
706405 
427082 
238510 
98031 
N/A 
20,760,194 
^JsT^^M;::' 
(116670) 
271304 
340738 
402978 
12811 
(332867) 
202434 
45760 
24519 
28965 
(8958) 
13501 
(67160) 
N/A 
817,355 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIER ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
%kJ&& ''••• .V.-V:':r'>: ,M&'-\£ 
(3.1) 
7.8 
18.4 
22.0 
0.7 
(20.3) 
13.0 
3.4 
2.1 
4.3 
(2.1) 
6.0 
(40.7) 
N/A 
4.1 
35
 14 ARAB AIR CARRIERS 1993 & 1994 COMPARED 
TABLE. 25 DOMESTIC SCHEDULED PASSENGERS 
l | r t i ?!| H i^i gfc-'-" "•.'"•• 
SAUDIA 
AIR ALGERIA 
EGYPT AIR 
LIBYAN ARAB 
GULF AIR 
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 
ALYEMEN 
SUDAN AIR 
SYRIAN ARAB 
R/JORDANIAN 
TUNIS AIR 
EMIRATES 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
KUWAIT 
AIRWAYS 
M E A 
T M A 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
l l l l l l l l l l l ' I j jg 1 | | | | | | | | | : j | | | | | ; \ \\'-': IS | :K+., 1 • 1
 fffTOT'' ' | .:." 
8063887 
1789515 
1044754 
853026 
798452 
364732 
186667 
182876 
42201 
40703 
5773 
\ N/A 
1 13,372,586 
8238113 
2100337 
1046421 
640812 
846769 
396280 
147810 
193850 
42277 
49693 
10517 
N/A 
13,712,879 
174226 
310822 
1667 
(212214) 
48317 
31548 
(38857) 
10974 
76 
8990 
4744 
N/A 
340,293 
2.2 
17.4 
0.2 
(24.9) 
6.1 
8.6 
(20.8) 
6.0 
0.2 
22.1 
82.2 
N/A 
2.5 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
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TABLE 26. TOTAL SCHEDULED FREIGHT 
' EMIRATES 73145 89367 16222 22.2 
R/JORDANIAN 54387 54549 162 0.3 
EGYPT AIR 40810 43405 2595 6.4 
ROYAL AIR 26294 24040 (2254) (8.6) 
MAROC 
SUDAN AIR 25398 26925 1527 6.0 
AIR ALGERIA 21164 23383 2219 10.5 
M E A 17275 16398 (877) (5.1) 
T M A 14266 16273 2007 14.1 
TUNIS AIR 12076 12544 468 3.9 
SYRIAN ARAB 4033 4870 837 20.8 
ALYEMEN 1530 1925 395 25.8 
LIBYAN ARAB 301 336 35 11.6 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
YEMEN AIRWAYS N/A N/A NIA N/A 
TOTAL 670,986 740,662 69,676 10.4 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
37
 TONNES CARRIED OF 15 ARAB AIR CARRIERS 1993 & 1994 COMPARED. 
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TABLE 27. TOTAL KILOMETERS FLOWN 38 
l l l l f e f J El U g l ^ l l i S 
simiii 
GULF AIR 
EGYPT AIR 
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 
EMIRATES 
R/JORDANIAN 
AIR ALGERIA 
KUWAIT 
AIRWAYS 
TUNIS AIR 
M E A 
SUDAN AIR 
SYRIAN ARAB 
LIBYAN ARAB 
ALYEMEN 
T M A 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
l l l l l - | / | | | | j 
124756 
72266 
51118 
47617 
44834 
36849 
33745 
33264 
32406 
15197 
12957 
10510 
5592 
4796 
4622 
N/A 
530,529 
P^;^^ISIK?$: Jim ml 
129296 
83229 
57558 
46597 
46488 
37776 
38202 
35112 
35784 
16792 
13650 
10905 
4338 
3767 
5299 
N/A 
564,793 
^H^ffp;1 
4540 
10963 
6440 
(1020) 
1654 
927 
4457 
1848 
3378 
1595 
693 
395 
(1254) 
(1029) 
677 
N/A 
34,264 
x"y::>>x- >:''•• ': : y "x' : ' '>'••••:•.••• 
3.6 
15.2 
12.6 
(2.1) 
3.7 
2.5 
13.2 
5.6 
10.4 
10.5 
5.3 
3.8 
(22.4) 
(21.5) 
14.6 
N/A 
6.5 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
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 IN THOUSANDS OF 15 ARAB AIR CARRIERS 1993 & 1994 COMPARED 
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TABLE 28. TOTAL SCHEDULED AVAILABLE 
SEAT-KMS IN THOUSANDS 39 
SAUDIA 
GULF AIR 
EGYPT AIR 
EMIRATES 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
R/IORDANIAN 
AIR ALGERIA 
TUNIS AIR 
M E A 
SYRIAN ARAB 
SUDAN AIR 
ALYEMEN 
LIBYAN ARAB 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
T M A 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
>S;|li§f I;!'. "• : ;;:i:8$&;: 
29246464 
13757591 
9133585 
8090039 
6537071 
6526429 
6212042 
4707916 
2935777 
2665453 
1627253 
1175544 
741662 
730015 
N/A 
| 94,086,841 
l&l&ia^v :.
 :V:W:: 
29552116 
15555828 
10373833 
9299439 
6719640 
7432015 
6434249 
4586441 
3247308 
2915010 
1756806 
1246070 
527367 
572986 
N/A 
100,219,108 
305652 
1798237 
1240248 
1209400 
182569 
905586 
222207 
(121475) 
311531 
249557 
129553 
70526 
(214295) 
(157029) 
N/A 
6,132,267 
_ J™ 
_
 I 0 
13.1 
13.6 
14.9 
2.8 
13.9 
3.6 
(2.6) 
10.6 
9.4 
8.0 
6.0 
(28.9) 
(21.5) 
N/A 
6.5 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION. Industry Affairs Department) 
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TABLE 29. TOTAL DEPARTURES 40 
m 
SAUDIA 
GULF AIR 
AIR ALGERIA 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
EGYPT AIR 
TUNIS AIR 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
R/iORDANIAN 
EMIRATES 
SUDAN AIR 
SYRIAN ARAB 
LIBYAN ARAB 
M E A 
ALYEMEN 
T M A 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
l l l l l l i l * •" . ill!!!!!! 
106956 
56351 
45463 
39108 
36599 
25700 
16259 
16221 
15482 
10935 
9887 
9251 
8700 
4768 
1755 
0 
N/A 
403,435 
110168 
61269 
45518 
35678 
42497 
27147 
17328 
16759 
18747 
11508 
9591 
7180 
9203 
3252 
1904 
0 
N/A 
417,749 
3212 
4918 
55 
(3430) 
5898 
1447 
1069 
538 
3265 
573 
(296) 
(2071) 
503 
(1516) 
149 
0 
N/A 
14,314 
j , , : : : ™ ™ - ™ : ' 
3.0 
8.7 
0.1 
(8.8) 
16.1 
5.6 
6.6 
3.3 
21.1 
5.2 
(3.0) 
(22.4) 
5.8 
(31.8) 
8.5 
0 
N/A 
3.5 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION. Industry Affairs Department) 
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TABLE 30. TOTAL HOURS FLOWN 41 
• HH ; '/•• ' i 1 
SAUDIA 
GULF AIR 
EGYPT AIR 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
AIR ALGERIA 
EMIRATES 
R/JGRDANIAN 
TUNIS AIR 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
M E A 
SUDAN AIR 
SYRIAN ARAB 
LIBYAN ARAB 
ALYEMEN 
T M A 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
. . v ,M ;:i::;::: | i ' \ , | • . . . . | | | | •:.•_: 
203287 
101093 
87643 
80738 
77935 
57451 
56617 
56567 
53238 
24169 
18402 
16778 
11113 
7852 
6176 
0 
N/A 
859,059 
,
 :-£!XJl3S§p^sI 
210073 
120196 
99894 
77766 
78793 
65772 
58080 
62178 
56224 
26507 
19350 
18859 
8371 
5513 
7082 
0 
N/A 
914,658 
n'iiwfiii • * s 
6786 3.3 
19103 18.9 
12251 14.0 
(2972) (3.7) 
858 1.1 
8321 14.5 
1463 2.6 
5611 9.9 
2986 5.6 
2338 9.7 
948 5.2 
2081 12.4 
(2742) (24.7) 
(2339) (29.8) 
906 14.7 
0 0 
N/A N/A 
55,599 6.5 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
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TABLE 31. TOTAL SCHEDULED PASSENGER 
LOAD FACTOR (%)42 
"••^•-•"-., i^\, •, m i 
LIBYAN ARAB 
EMIRATES 
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 
R/JORDANIAN 
TUNIS AIR 
AIR ALGERIA 
GULF AIR 
SAUDIA 
KUWAIT 
AIRWAYS 
EGYPT AIR 
ALYEMEN 
M E A 
SYRIAN ARAB 
SUDAN AIR 
IRAQI AIRWAYS 
T M A 
YEMEN AIRWAYS 
TOTAL 
• ';V. - . - .y-yy- •• — - - • - -
"""' 77.43 
69.02 
67.23 
64.45 
63.89 
63.61 
63.54 
63.50 
62.11 
57.77 
56.53 
54.75 
51.31 
49.35 
0 
0 
N/A 
63.09 
^
T
* ^
V
' £ ~ Y " F T — - ^ 1 
'^' 74.20 
68.79 
68.05 
64.58 
60.80 
63.97 
62.71 
61.76 
60.74 
60.12 
54.57 
54.47 
47.70 
49.35 
0 
0 
N/A 
62.41 
^W¥W$$i- ' 
(3.23) 
(0.23) 
0.82 
0.13 
(3.09) 
0.36 
(0.83) 
(1.75) 
(1.37) 
2.35 
(1.96) 
(0.28) 
(3.61) 
0.00 
0 
0 
N/A 
(0.68) 
WW§$$$$?$ ^JHy&^Jl 
(4.2) 
(0.3) 
1.2 
0.2 
(4.8) 
0.6 
(1.3) 
(2.7) 
(2.2) 
4.1 
(3.5) 
(0.5) 
(7.0) 
0.00 
0 
0 
N/A 
(1.1) 
(Source: ARAB AIR CARRIERS ORGANIZATION, Industry Affairs Department) 
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TABLE 32. ARAB AIR CARRIERS CODES. 
AIRLINE CODES 
SV 
GF 
AH 
MS 
AT 
LN 
ME 
RJ 
EK 
KU 
RB 
IA 
IY 
SD 
TL 
DY 
7Q 
AIRLINE 
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES 
GULF AIRLINES 
AIR ALGERIA 
EGYPT AIR 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 
MEDDLE EAST AIRLINES 
ROYAL JORDANIAN 
EMIRATES 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES 
IRAQ AIRWAYS 
YEMENIA AIRWAYS 
SUDAN AIRWAYS 
TRANS-MEDITERRANEAN 
AIRWAYS 
ALYEMDA -YEMEN AIRLINES 
QATAR AIR 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIR DEPARTMENT) 
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FIGURE 28. FLEET OF 18 ARAB AIR CARRIERS 
BY AIRLINE AS AT 31.12.1994 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIR DEPARTMENTS) 
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FIGURE 29. FLEET OF ARAB AIR CARRIERS AS 
31.12.1993 
LOCKHEED 
OTHERS 7% 
18% ^ - 1 - ^ ^ 
/ j | H k AIRBUS 
BOBNG 
52% 
D LOCKHEED 
m AIRBUS 
n BOBNG 
D OTHERS 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIR DEPARTMENT) 
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FIGURE 30. AACO & SAUDIA EMPLOYEE 1986-1993 
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FIGURE 31. AACO & SAUDIA PASSENGERS 
CARRIED 1986-1993 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT) 
I l l 
FIGURE 32. AACO & SAUDIA EMPLOYEES PRODUCTION 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT) 
43 1986-1993 (ALL SERVICES) 
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FIGURE 33. INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED LOAD FACTORS 
OF AACO & SAUDIA 1986-1993 
(Source: AACO, INDUSTRY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT) 
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FIGURE 34. DOMESTIC SCHEDULED LOAD FACTORS 
OF AACO & SAUDIA 1986-1993 
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4.0 Empirical Finding and Data Analysis 
4.1 Simulation Analysis? 
A comparative analysis is a very important method to be considered in this 
type of research, as it will help you understnad the relationship between airline 
performance and privatization. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the 
performance of an airline before and after the implementation of privatization. 
There are different ways to conduct a comparative analysis. For example, a 
financial analysis of the company and its profitability before and after privatization 
can be conducted. Other examples can be the production rate, total performance, 
and their respective capital investments. 
A successful privatization program should, in most cases, give a large gain 
to buyers. In the case of British Airways, for instance, the gains were high. 
Investors and employees overall came out as winners. The results of the gain were 
high because British Airways' employees were able to own shares of their 
company at low prices.44 In most cases, private airlines have achieved lower 
operation costs than the government-owned airlines. This is due to the fact that 
private investment has a better view of the company's resources and how to utilize 
them efficiently. This is especially true when some major modifications have 
taken place i.e.(geographic location changes). 
44
 Ibid. 2 
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New services by the airline after the privatization could be offered. The 
passengers are the first to feel the improvements brought about by privatization. 
The airline will be able, at this point, to compete on a much stronger level with 
other international carriers serving the same routes. The ultimate goals are to gain 
more revenue and improve services. The operation and the profitability of the 
company are the two main factors affecting the survival of an airline. The new 
owner should take into account the changes in the economic environment that 
would have an impact on the levels of performance of the airline. 
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4.2 BRTTTSH AIRWAYS 
British Airways' overall operation has been examined to determine the 
impact of privatization on the airline's performance. A series of data has been 
collected to better evaluate the effectiveness of privatization. This data includes 
ASKs, RPKs, revenues, expenditures, profits, passenger load factors, and weight 
load factors which were gathered from IATA Annual Reports. 
A further analysis of British Airways' data must be studied carefully to find 
the net impact of privatization. There are other environmental factors that could 
help the airline perform better under privatization. Other airlines have been 
privatized because, on a national level, they were undergoing a period of slow 
growth economy and recession at the same time. One of the significant aspects of 
an airline privatization is to allow the airline to compete freely with other 
international carriers. In this healthy environment, the airline is expected to grow 
faster. 
An equation has been used to formulate the regression analysis model 
which utilized the independent variables. A binary variable was used when 
applying the regression analysis, by using zero before privatization, and one (l)for 
after privatization. 
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The data presented in the table are the result of the regression analysis for 
British Airways. The value of t.statistic in the table represents the ratio between 
the parameter and the standard of deviation of the parameter. The binary variable 
for RPKs shows that RPKs for British Airways have increased by 15,934,096 due 
to the effect of privatization. The constant for the RPK parameter was 27,173,385 
and the value of ratio of the t.statistic was (4.52). The value of RPKs has 
increased with time due to privatization. The value for t.statistics was (3.71), 
which is acceptable. In order to evaluate the positive impact of privatization, the 
value of t.statistics must be at least greater than 1.7. 
TABLE 33. BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
I Approach 
RPKs 
ASK's 
ATK's 
RTC 
L.F 
W.L.F 
Revenue 
Constant 
27173385 
(4.52)** 
44809907.05 
(5.29)** 
5378339 
(4.67)** 
3094561 
(4.05) 
62.67 
(32.49)** 
59.95 
(33.03)"" 
1930.13 
(2.42)"" 
Time 
1809226.8 
(3.71)** 
2186468 
(3.18)** 
328160.1 
(3.51)** 
257844 
(4.16)** 
0.55 
(3.51)** 
0.48 
(3.28)** 
638.12 
(8.47)** 
1* 
15934096 
(2.94)** 
22250353.89 
(2.92)** 
3581936 
(3.46)** 
2136703 
(3.10)** 
-0.7761 
(0.45) 
-2.36 
(1.44) 
-2830.99 
(3.83)"* 
R1 
0.906005 
0.890052693 
0.913578 
0.919946 
0.69691 
0.526431 
0.881353 
** Significant @ 1% level 
* Significant @ 5% level 
P = Binary number (A dummy variable to compute the effect of privatization) 
p0 = Years before privatization 
P, = Years after privatization 
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In this research, we performed a multiple linear regression analysis and also 
calculated the slope of the trendline that best fits the data in the chart. The 
previous data were generated as an output of the regression analysis presented in 
Table 33. By doing a comparison using the data generated by the regression 
analysis, we notice the effect on the variables before and after privatization. The 
constant represents the y-axis intercept. The Revalue shows the reliability of the 
regression. Values closer to one indicate a stronger correlation. The X-Coefficient 
represents the slope of each independent variable. 
A comparison of the regression data output will be calculated to show the 
difference before privatization and after privatization, using the following equation 
for ASK as an example: 
(1) ASK = C0 + C, (t) + C2((3) 
Where: 
C0 = Is the constant. 
Cj = Is the X.Coefficient. 
t
 = Time. 
C2= P X.Coefficient. 
P
 = Is the binary number. 
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The data that were generated from the calculation shows an increase in 
ASK after privatization. As a matter of fact, the previous value of ASK was 
86,352,799 and after applying the formula it was 108,603,150. 
To compare the profit versus employee, we utilize the following formula as 
an example: 
(2) Profit = p + p, (Employee). 
The result shows that before privatization profits were increased by $657.72 for 
each employee, and after privatization they increased to $872.64. 
Where: 
p0 = Is the constant. 
p]
 = X. coefficient 
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4.3 British Airport Authority 
The data presented in Table 34 are the result of the regression analysis for 
British Airport Authority. The values for t.statistic in the table represent the ratio 
between the parameter and the standard of deviation of the parameter. The dummy 
variable for the number of passengers carried as an example shows that number of 
passengers carried has increased due to the effect of privatization. The constant 
was 35.36, and the value of ratio of the t.statistic was (13.65). The value for the 
time has increased due to privatization. The value for t.statistics was (9.1) which 
highly significant. 
The original number of passengers before privatization was 4683.71. Using 
the previous equation, the numbers of passengers increased to 4691.2. Also cargo 
and mail increased from 74,967 to 75,035. Revenues, aircraft movement, and 
profits have all experienced an increase. A comparison of the number of 
passengers versus revenue shows an increase after privatization from 364 to 382. 
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TABLE 34. BAA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Approach 
Pax. Carried 
Cargo & Mail 
Air Transport 
Movement 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Profit After 
Tax 
Constant 
35.36 
** 
(13.65) 573.64 
** 
(6.89) 469.60 
(18.43)*" 
19.17 
(0.25) 
57.11 
(1.20) 
-36.59 
(0.93) 
Time 
2.33 
(9.01)** 
37.29 
(4.52)** 
20.32 
(8.05)** 
55.75 
(7.42)** 
37.31 
(7.95)** 
12.27 
(3.17)** 
P 
7.46 
(2.96)** 
68.39 
(0.84) 
53.53 
(2.16)** 
85.33 
(1.16) 
13.28 
(0.29) 
44.33 
(1.17) 
R' 
0.975273 
0.888276 
0.966081 
0.95323 
0.95055 
0.835622 
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4.4 LANCHTT F 
Lanchile was partially privatized in 1989 The purpose of analyzing 
partially privatized airlines is to evaluate the effectiveness of privatization on a 
partially privatized airline. 
Using load factor as an example, the binary variable shows an increase due 
to the effect of privatization. The value of the constant was 58.68, and the value of 
ratio of the t.statistic was (18.61). The value of the time variable has increased due 
to privatization, while the value for t.statistics was (1.84) which is a good index of 
a positive impact of privatization. 
Using the formula to compare the performance of the airline before and 
after privatization, we can detect an increase in ASK, ATK, RPK and a slight 
increase in revenue. Load factor and profit did not experience an increase after 
privatization. This is probably due to the fact that the airline is not fully privatized 
and the government still holds some shares in the airlines. Various managerial 
problems or poor state of economy might also have had a negative impact. Other 
factors which could effect load factors are. poor marketing technique, buying more 
aircraft than they need. 
TABLE 36. LANCHILE REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULT 
Approach 
j RPKs 
ASKs 
ATKs 
Revenue 
L.F 
Expenditure 
Profit 
Constant 
1172376 
(4.55)" 
2018767 
(6.12)" 
335949.8 
s j c * 
(4.66) 
75.71 
(4.13)** 
58.68 
X * 
(18.61) 
105.43 
(4.80) 
-27.15 
** 
(2.24) 
Time 
52163.72 
(1.84/ 
57024.21 
(1.57) 
14576.02 
(1.84)* 
11.29 
(5.61) 
0.6379 
(1.84)* 
7.11 
(2.95) 
3.44 
(2.59) 
P 
239872.7 
(0.92) 
528809.6 
(1.58) 
141735 
(1.93)* 
46.61 
** 
(2.50) 
-3.22 
(1.00) 
66.66 
(2.98)** 
-14.95 
(1.22) 
R2 
0.551938 
0.610585 
0.6922 
0.914668 
0.277755 
0.847626 
0.441054 
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4^ARGENTTNA 
Aerolineas Argentina was partially privatized in 1990. The purpose is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of privatization on airlines which have experienced 
partial privatization. 
Using ASKs as an example, the dummy variable shows an increase due to 
the effect of privatization. The value of the constant was 10,444,334 and the value 
of ratio of the t.statistic was (15.92). At the same time, the value of the time 
variable has increased ASKs to 187,884.6 due to privatization. The value for 
t.statistis is (3.01) which is an acceptable figure. 
The regression analysis result shows an increase in ASK, RPK, and profit. 
On the other hand, revenue decreased slightly after privatization. However, profit 
versus employment has increased which is an indication that privatization lead to 
improve performance. 
TABLE 37. ARGENTINA REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULT 
Approach 
RPKs 
ASKs 
ATKs 
Revenue 
L.F 
Expenditure 
Profit 
Constant 
5075998 
** 
(6.54) 10444334 
** 
(15.92) 1432445 
** 
(13.40) 850 
** 
(6.69) 50.90 
(10.79)" 
905.95 
(6.73)** 
-95.84 
(0.58) 
Time 
269440.2 
(3.65)** 
187884.6 
(3.01)** 
6682.23 
(0.66) 
-29.26 
(2.42)** 
1.26 
(2.81)** 
-35.65 
(2.78)** 
8.88 
(0.57) 
P 
89321.9 
(0.12) 
849768.4 
(1.31) 
225966.3 
(2.14)** 
343.09 
(2.74)** 
-4.17 
(0.89) 
369.48 
(2.78)** 
-102.50 
(0.63) 
R2 
0.695747 
0.721678 
0.527839 
0.453915 
0.477547 
0.488001 
0.043072 
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4AAIRNEW ZFAT AND 
The Air New Zealand was privatized in 1988, and its privatization program 
was also a success. Looking at the data in the table, we find that RPKs value is 
4,296,326 with a ratio of (9.81). The regression analysis output shows that over 
the time RPKs value has increased by 642,434.1 and the value for t.statistic is 
(11.83). 
When evaluating the performance of the airline before privatization and 
after privatization, we concluded that ASK, RPK, and revenue have increased. 
Employment versus revenue has also increased after privatization. 
TABLE 38. AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULT 
Approach 
RPKs 
ASKs 
ATKs 
Revenue 
L.F 
Expenditure 
Profit 
Constant 
4296326 
(9.81)** 
6870465 
(12.87)" 
892003.2 
(8.30) 
385.63 
(2.19)" 
64.26 
(23.86) 
409.72 
(2.26)** 
-20.18 
(0.59) 
Time 
642434.1 
(11.83)** 
839641.3 
(12.68)** 
110211.7 
(8.27)** 
54.32 
(2.48)" 
0.643846 
(1.93)* 
42.97 
(1.91)* 
11.41 
(2.71)** 
P 
-881649 
(2.00)** 
89571.4 
(0.17) 
168145.1 
(1.56) 
-138.47 
(0.78) 
-6.59 
(2.43)** 
-92.40 
(0.51) 
-71.1 
(2.08)** 
R2 
0.967397 
0.978705 
0.962404 
0.506428 
0.371806 
0.396806 
0.424775 
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4JJBrjefHistorv of Saudi Arabian Airlines 
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SV) started its operation in 1945. The first DC-3 
aircraft that arrived in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on March 10, 1945 was a gift 
from the President Roosevelt. A few months later, two other DC-3s arrived in the 
Kingdom to start operations-carrying passengers and mail between Jeddah, Riyadh 
and Dhahran. 
Saudia was formally established in September 1946 under the support of the 
Saudi Ministry of Defense. It was on March 14, 1947 that the first scheduled 
services were inaugurated between Jeddah, Riyadh, Hofuf, and Dhahran. Today, 
the SV fleet is almost 113 aircraft.45 
After fifty years of progress, SV is diverting to a new philosophy which will 
allow it to meet the trend toward liberalization. In accordance with the directive of 
the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques regarding the privatization of State Owned 
Enterprise (SOE), Saudia set a program focusing on the commercialization of the 
airline's activities and all aspects of the airline's operations. This is achieved by 
providing the training and resources to raise the standard of the airline services. 
45
 Saudia World, May, 1995. 
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Today Saudia is preparing itself for new challenges that will make the airline 
more competitive in their business. Privatization is expected to give the private 
sector the chance to join Saudia-a move in hopes of improving the overall position 
of Saudia among International Carriers. Also privatization will create employment 
opportunities for younger, qualified Saudis. This will benefit both the Saudi citizens 
and the national economy. 
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4.8 Current Situation 
Re-engineering the processes of the work is one of the challenges that Saudia 
is facing today. This massive re-engineering program is done through all aspects of 
the airline's operation. Also SV is re-evaluating its route structure to reduce costs. 
The re-engineering process in Saudia should help the airline achieve a dramatic 
improvement in overall performance. 
SV is changing the old bureaucratic system to a more decentralized decision-
making system. This new structure will allow the lower level managers to make 
decisions without waiting for approval from the top level management. The new 
system will also allow employees to be involved in the decision-making process. 
A fleet replacement program is underway at SV. Saudia has signed a deal 
with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to provide the airline with sixty new planes 
within the next six years. Fleet mixing is a very important strategy which Saudia is 
pursuing to allow the appropriate configuration mix of aircraft. This strategy will 
help SV to reduce extra costs associated with operating different types of aircrafts 
and manufacturers. 
129 
4.9 D A T A ANALYSTS FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES 
TABLE 39. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES OPERATIONAL RESULTS 
TOTAL SCHEDULED SERVICES 1977-1995 
YEAR 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
ASKs 
7806259 
10230629 
13656371 
16617965 
18200087 
19135865 
21863428 
25173000 
26571000 
28193000 
28301000 
26875000 
26757000 
27835000 
24712000 
28742000 
31816000 
29552117 
28778221 
ATKs 
1243493 
1660376 
2395939 
2407872 
2711116 
3046925 
3533334 
4097000 
4169000 
4208000 
4272000 
4118000 
4236000 
4438000 
3976000 
4771000 
5240000 
5049530 
5051740 
RPKs 
4992646 
6771004 
8540150 
9937985 
10508237 
12277460 
14621488 
15845000 
15856000 
15432000 
16145000 
15444000 
16238000 
16694000 
15585000 
18297000 
19540000 
18249969 
18501426 
RTC 
522300 
749820 
931537 
1069492 
1204099 
1478347 
1767106 
1952000 
1937000 
1871000 
1965000 
1930000 
2100000 
2172000 
1955000 
2381000 
2520000 
2224058 
2224664 
(Source: SAUDIA Statistical Annual Report) 
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TABLE 40. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES OPERATIONAL RESULT 
TOTAL SCHEDULED SERVICES 1977-1995 
YEAR 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
PAX L.F 
63.1 
66.2 
62.5 
59.8 
57.7 
64.2 
66.9 
63.0 
60.0 
55.0 
57.0 
57.0 
61.0 
60.0 
63.0 
64.0 
61.0 
62.0 
64.0 
WEIGHT L.F 
44.4 
45.2 
38.9 
44.4 
44.4 
48.5 
50.0 
48.0 
46.0 
44.0 
46.0 
47.0 
50.0 
49.0 
49.0 
50.0 
48.0 
49.0 
51 
PERSONNEL 
10766 
12657 
16000 
18775 
22446 
23730 
23354 
24732 
25546 
24408 
23106 
23773 
24064 
23834 
23785 
23739 
23924 
25088 
24950 
FLEET 
36 
48 
50 
48 
57 
64 
61 
91 
101 
113 
106 
108 
107 
106 
109 
109 
110 
110 
110 
(Source: SAUDIA Statistical Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 35. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES OPERATIONAL RESULT 
(Source: SAUDIA Statistical Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 36. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES OPERATIONAL RESULT 
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FIGURE 37. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES OPERATIONAL RESULT 
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FIGURE 38. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES PERSONNEL 1977-1995 
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FIGURE 39. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FLEET 1977-1995 
(Source: SAUDIA Statistical Annual Report) 
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TABLE 41. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FINANCIAL RESULTS 
TOTAL SERVICES 1984-1993 
YEAR 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
T.CURRENT.LIBILITY($) 
1542.90 
1795.73 
2240.53 
1700.80 
2055.73 
2372.53 
2761.60 
3248.80 
3673.60 
3872.00 
ASSETS 
3512.5 
4004.5 
4729.8 
4701.8 
4822.9 
4867.5 
4832.3 
4949.6 
4989.8 
5035.2 
REVENUE(S) 
1980266752 
1934661204 
1887733520 
1795733330 
1694133330 
1907466750 
2048450650 
2089650354 
2351733250 
2473066750 
EXPENSES(S) 
1943467125 
1973333950 
1988266750 
1849650660 
1955250130 
1946450620 
2101650321 
2125066750 
2374933320 
2633333333 
NET 
INCOME($) 
36799627 
-38672746 
-100533230 
-53917330 
-261116800 
-389838870 
-53199671 
-35416396 
-23200070 
-160266583 
(Source: SAUDIA Statistical Annual Report) 
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FIGURE 40. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FINANCIAL RESULT 1984-1993 
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FIGURE 41. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FINANCIAL RESULT 1984-1993 
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4.10 Regression Analysis for SanHi Arabian Airlines 
TABLE 42. REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULT FOR SAUDIA 
Approach 
RPKs 
ASKs 
ATKs 
RTC 
L.F 
Revenue 
Net Income 
Constant 
7376821 
(4.37)* 
12142032 
(3.75)" 
1794028 
(4.18)" 
793824.6 
(3.42)" 
62.03 
(18.94)" 
1.7E+09 
(9.60)" 
-3.6E+07 
(0.41)* 
X.Coefficient 
680614.54 
(9.63)* 
1105881 
(8.15)* 
192309.4 
(10.71)" 
94061.87 
(9.66)" 
-0.0593 
(0.43)" 
56580447.6 
(2.89)" 
-6760103.5 
(0.71)* 
R1 
0.845063 
0.79629 
0.870941 
0.84605 
0.010871 
0.511503 
0.060033 
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4.11 Findings 
After reviewing the data analyzed for each airline, it was found that there is 
some evidence of improvement in some aspects of the airlines that were analyzed. 
This is evident in the data of British Airways. BA's revenue has experienced an 
increase after privatization. On the other hand, other airlines such as the Lanchile^s 
and the Argentina's showed signs of improvement in some aspects of their 
operations. However, Chile and Argentina airlines' improvement were not as 
significant as BA's. 
In the case of Aerolineas Argentines, the result of the regression analysis 
showed weak performance even after privatization. Part of the reason for this weak 
result may be because of the government still owns shares in the airline. Also, a 
weak economy has affected the airline's performance. 
Air New Zealand results showed an impressive improvement on its 
operational side. According to the regression analysis, the overall performance of 
the airline after privatization has improved. 
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British Airport Authority is another success due to privatization. BAA has 
achieved better performance and services, and profit has increased. 
An important point must be considered in this research study, which is the 
effect of environmental changes. As in the case of all the airlines that were tested, 
after the Gulf War, most airlines experienced reduced earnings. Air travel around 
the world has been affected one way or another due to the War in the Gulf. The 
airlines that were studied in this paper show a decline in their operational 
performance. Some airlines took between two to four years to return to their normal 
earning. On the other hand, some of the airlines that were analyzed took more time 
to recover their losses. 
When performing a regression analysis on a particular airline, the data 
explained how the airline has been acting in the past years. For example, although 
BA maintained a steady increase in profit before the Gulf War, it still experienced a 
decline in its revenue. 
A trend line analysis was performed for each airline for most of their 
available operational and financial data. Four different types of trend lines were 
analyzed; they are Polynomial, Linear, Exponential, and Logarithmic. The purpose 
of this analysis is to find the best line that fits a given data set. In the case of Saudi 
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Arabian Airlines, the best fit for the RPKs was the polynomial line with R square 
value of 94.06%. These results are presented in Appendix B. 
To simulate what could happen to Saudia Airlines if it were to privatize, 
British Airways was chosen to be compared to Saudia. This is done because of 
some similarities between both airlines. At the time when BA was privatized in 
1987, its fleet size consisted of 151 aircraft. Currently Saudia owns about 110 
aircraft; some of those will be sold to other airlines. With the delivery of new 
aircrafts, the total number will be close to 148 aircraft. Considering Saudia will be 
fully privatized and holding the environmental changes as constant, one could 
speculate that Saudia might achieve the kind of success that BA has experienced in 
the past. A fifteen-year forecast has been conducted for Saudia in most of its 
operational and financial aspects. The results of the forecast are included in 
Appendix A of the research. 
Utilizing formulas one and two to find out the results for Saudia. The output 
were as follows: 
Y: Simulated revenue. 
X: Time. 
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Following the procedure, we get the y-value for Saudia revenue to be 
$3,114,511,200 in year 25, which increases over time after privatization. Choosing 
an operational variable such as ATK, it also increases after privatization from 
5,051,740 to 6,601,763. 
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5.0 Recommendations 
Saudi Arabian Airlines overall operations have grown tremendously over the 
past fifty years. The airline started off as a small carrier in 1946 and became the 
largest carrier in the Middle East. Saudi Airlines has made a marked improvement 
in its global presence. After the last deal with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the 
airline will expand to capture more opportunities and can provide better services to 
its customers. 
In the international arena, Saudia's global competition status has improved 
its quality of services. Combined with its widely spread route structure, Saudia 
seeks to deliver the best services available to its passengers. 
The right decision was made at the right time to privatize the airline. This 
comes at a time when the air transport industry is getting more competitive. In 
order for Saudi Airlines to survive, it must compete with other carriers regardless of 
size or scope of operation. In order for the airline to succeed, a number of actions 
should be taken to ensure the success. 
Since the airline was working under government ownership, a series of 
events must take place. The management needs to review the organization structure 
that can help Saudia improve its services. A total re-engineering program is needed 
to address the current management practice. The whole process of doing business 
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needs to be looked at and reviewed for changes that will work under private 
ownership. Also the managers need to question the current position of the airline 
and identify its internal strength and weakness. On the other hand, the managers 
must identify the airline's external opportunities and threats. This analysis will help 
the management to make better decisions. 
In order for the airline to achieve higher profitability and performance from 
privatization, the airline must take measures to convert its disadvantages to 
advantages. The most important task is to turn the airline from a cost center to a 
profit center. This is not an easy task that could be achieved within a short period of 
time. In fact, it takes a lot of effort from all organization levels to make 
privatization work. 
A complete review of management practices must be conducted. A new 
mission statement must be written or the previous one can be modified. The scope 
of the private sector is different from SOE; therefore, a new set of objectives must 
go along with the new change. 
The process of re-engineering does not only focuses on organization structure 
but it must also focus on the employees. The role of the employees in this stage is 
very important, since they are the ones who are dealing directly with passengers. 
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A complete and thorough image must be impressed onto the employees, so they can 
help carry out the new mission of the airline. 
The Human Resource Department has an important role to perform. A new 
set of rules for evaluating the employees' performance must be presented to achieve 
better results from privatization. Also a program for appraisal, reward, and 
motivation must be reviewed to cope with the new change. Although some of these 
programs are in use, they need to be reviewed and modified. 
On the international arena, Saudi Airline's management needs to review the 
route structure for Saudia to capture more markets and to compete better in the 
global market. The management should think about forming a strategic alliance with 
other international carriers. This will allow Saudia to spread its boundaries even 
further. By combining services and exchanging expertise, the airline can benefit 
from alliances. 
Furthermore, fleet configuration is a very important issue for all airlines. 
Saudia must have the right configuration of aircraft mix. This is important because 
it will help reduce cost and allow the airline to have less inventory of spare parts. It 
is better for the airline to deal with fewer aircraft manufacturers because of the 
learning rate. This will reduce its overall maintenance and operational costs. 
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Choosing the right aircraft for the right route is also important in the control of the 
operational cost and it will help reduce training costs. 
Saudia also needs to invest in an Information System to allow the airline to 
compete globally with other international airlines. 
Customer service should be on the top priority list for Saudia. Also they must 
recognize passengers as their key resources. In order for the airline to capture the 
customer loyalty, Saudia needs to put more emphasis on customer satisfaction. 
Saudia Airline also needs to look at other opportunities to merge with other 
carriers because benefits are tremendous. It could reduce the cost of the operation 
by sharing joint maintenance and other aspects of the operation. Other combined 
operational services that Saudia could venture into are joint training, crew exchange, 
sharing ground facilities, combined reservation system, and sharing ticketing 
offices. Cost reduction is the key word, and the most important thing is to find more 
ways to achieve the cost reduction in operations that Saudia needs. When 
considering a merger with other airlines, Saudia should pick partners who will allow 
Saudia to stretch its presence in the world. Also Saudia must look for partners who 
have a strong standing history in air travel. The benefits would be felt by both the 
airlines and the passengers. The merger would make it easier for passengers of both 
airlines to transfer tickets and avoid the hassle of losing time. 
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Saudia Airline can expect to achieve higher performance and productivity 
from its employees by allowing them to own shares in the airline. This is a strategy 
that will boost employee morale to make their airline a successful one. 
In conclusion, it appears that privatization could bring a positive prospect to 
Saudi Arabian Airlines. Also it could help improve effeciency, labor productivity, 
and profitability. 
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Appendix .A : Regression Analysis 
SAUDIA AIRLINES REGRESSION ANALYSIS 153 
TIME 
1* 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
RPK 
4,992,646 
6,771,004 
8,540,150 
9,937,985 
10,508,237 
12,277,460 
14,621,488 
15,845,000 
15,856,000 
15,432,000 
16,145,000 
15,444,000 
16,238,000 
16,694,000 
15,585,000 
18,297,000 
19,540,000 
18,249,969 
18,501,426 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
StdErrofYEst 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
RPKs 
X Coefficie 680614.5456 
StdErrofC 70682.06717 
t.statistic 9.629239394 
7376821 
1687511 
0.845063 
19 
17 
t.statistic 
4.37142048 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
20,989,112 
21,669,727 
22,350,341 
23,030,956 
23,711,570 
24,392,185 
25,072,799 
25,753,414 
26,434,028 
27,114,643 
27,795,257 
28,475,872 
29,156,487 
33 | 29,837,101 
34 ' 30,517,716 
* Time was started at year 1977 to 1995. 
The forecast started from year 1996 to 2010. 
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TIME 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
ATKs 
1,243,493 
1,660,376 
2,395,939 
2,407,872 
2,711,116 
3,046,925 
3,533,334 
4,097,000 
4,169,000 
4,208,000 
4,272,000 
4,118,000 
4,236,000 
4,438,000 
3,976,000 
4,771,000 
5,240,000 
5,049,530 
5,051,740 
Constant 
StdErrofYEst 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
ATKs 
XCoefficie 192309.4 
StdErrofC 17954.59 
t.statistic 10.71088 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
Regression Output: 
1794028 tstatistic 
428660 4.185201 
0.870941 
19 
17 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
5,640,217 
5,832,526 
6,024,835 
6,217,145 
6,409,454 
6,601,764 
6,794,073 
6,986,382 
7,178,692 
7,371,001 
7,563,311 
7,755,620 
7,947,930 
8,140,239 
8,332,548 
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TIME 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
ASKs 
7,806,259 
10,230,629 
13,656,371 
16,617,965 
18,200,087 
19,135,865 
21,863,428 
25,173,000 
26,571,000 
28,193,000 
28,301,000 
26,875,000 
26,757,000 
27,835,000 
24,712,000 
28,742,000 
31,816,000 
29,552,117 
28,778,221 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
ASKs 
XCoefficie 1105881 
StdErrofC 135660.9 
tstatstic 8.151803 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
Regression Output: 
12142032 tstatstic 
3238859 3.748861 
0.79629 
19 
17 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
34,259,646 
35,365,527 
36,471,407 
37,577,288 
38,683,169 
39,789,049 
40,894,930 
42,000,811 
43,106,692 
44,212,572 
45,318,453 
46,424,334 
47,530,214 
48,636,095 
49,741,976 
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TIME 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
REVENUE(billion) 
1,980,266,752 
1,934,661,204 
1,887,733,520 
1,795,733,330 
1,694,133,330 
1,907,466,750 
2,048,450,650 
2,089,650,354 
2,351,733,250 
10 i 2,473,066,750 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
REVENUE 
X Coefficie 56580447.6 
StdErrofC 19549178.79 
tstatistic 2.894262117 
1.7E+09 tstatistic 
1.8E+08 9.602706 
0.511503 
10 
8 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2,327,482,051 
2,384,062,498 
2,440,642,946 
2,497,223,394 
2,553,803,841 
2,610,384,289 
2,666,964,736 
2,723,545,184 
2,780,125,632 
2,836,706,079 
21 2,893,286,527 
22 2,949,866,974 
23 3,006,447,422 
24 3,063,027,870 
25 3,119,608,317 
*Started at year 1984 to 1993 
The forecast started at year 1994 to year 2008 
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TIME 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
NET INCOME 
36,799,627 
(38,672,746) 
(100,533,230) 
(53,917,330) 
(261,116,800) 
(38,983,870) 
-53199671 
(35,416,396) 
(23,200,070) 
(160,266,583) 
Regression Output: 
-3.6E+07 tstatistic 
85900562 -0.41525 
0.060033 
10 
8 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Net Income 
XCoefficie -6760103.5 
Std Err of C 9457340.63 
tstatistic -0.7147996 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
(110,031,276) 
(116,791,380) 
(123,551,483) 
(130,311,587) 
(137,071,690) 
(143,831,794) 
(150,591,897) 
(157,352,001) 
(164,112,104) 
(170,872,208) 
(177,632,311) 
(184,392,415) 
(191,152,519) 
24 (197,912,622) 
25 1(204,672,726) 
SAUDIA AIRLINES REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1 
Regression 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
L.F 
X Coefficie -0.0593 
StdErrofC 0.137185 
t.statistic -0.43225 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
61 
61 
61 
61 
61 
61 
60 
60 
60 
29 | 60 
30 j 60 
31 ! 60 
32 j 60 
33 ! 60 
Output: 
62.03509 t.statistic 
3.275237 18.94064 
0.010871 
19 
17 
SAUDIA AIRLINES REGRESSION ANALYSIS 159 
TIME 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
RTC 
522,300 
749,820 
931,537 
1,069,492 
1,204,099 
1,478,347 
1,767,106 
1,952,000 
1,937,000 
1,871,000 
1,965,000 
1,930,000 
2,100,000 
2,172,000 
1,955,000 
2,381,000 
2,520,000 
2,224,058 
2,224,664 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
RTC 
XCoefficie 94061.87 
StdErrofC 9731.542 
tstatistic 9.66567 
15 YEAR FORECAST 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
2,675,062 
2,769,124 
2,863,186 
2,957,248 
3,051,310 
3,145,371 
3,239,433 
3,333,495 
3,427,557 
3,521,619 
3,615,681 
3,709,743 
3,803,805 
3,897,866 
3,991,928 
793824.6 tstatistic 
232337.4 3.416689 
0.84605 
19 
17 
BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 160 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
RPKs 
28,881,559 
35,405,771 
41,082,463 
40,140,169 
39,047,814 
37,277,686 
34,442,693 
34,206,000 
41,102,652 
40,429,976 
0 46,299,426 
1 56,939,495 
1 60,757,570 
1 66,794,988 
1 62,834,832 
1 72,491,372 
1 80,083,721 
1 81,907,000 
87,395,000 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 1809226.8 
Std Err of C 487828.88 
tstatistic 3.7087325 
27173385 tstatistic 
6014358 4.518086 
0.906005 
19 
16 
Dummy 
15934096 
5411783 
2.944334 
vatized in 1987 
13 YEARS 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
; 31 
32 
FORECAST 
79,292,018 
81,101,245 
82,910,472 
84,719,698 
86,528,925 
88,338,152 
90,147,379 
91,956,606 
93,765,832 
95,575,059 
97,384,286 
99,193,513 
101,002,740 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FORECAST FOR RPK 
105 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
REVENUE 
3,391 
3,325 
3,284 
3,895 
4,226 
5,484 
6,857 
7,168 
8,332 
8,295 
9,090 
8,405 
6,602 
7,177 
Regression Output: 
ne startes at 1982 through 1995 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficie 
Std Err of C 
tstatistic 
Time 
638.117 
75.31592 
8.472538 
1930.135 tstatistic 
797.0687 2.421541 
0.881353 
14 
11 
Dummy 
-2830.99 
739.9196 
-3.82608 
13 YEARS FORECAST 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
ro
 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
8,671 
9,309 
9,947 
10,585 
11,223 
11,861 
12,500 
13,138 
13,776 
14,414 
15,052 
15,690 
16,328 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FORECASTED REVENUE! 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 162 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ATKs 
6,193,346 
7,021,073 
7,600,691 
7,929,614 
7,333,783 
6,827,102 
6,631,316 
7,109,057 
7,746,012 
7,989,453 
8,438,851 
11,320,044 
11,750,684 
13,008,504 
12,865,477 
14,156,749 
15,831,598 
16,240,000 
17,201,000 
Regression Output: 
e forecast up to year 2008 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficient^ 328160.1 
Std Err of Coe 93394.53 
tstatistic 3.513697 
5378339 tstatistic 
1151445 4.670947 
0.913578 
19 
16 
Dummy 
3581936 
1036083 
3.457192 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
15,523,478 
15,851,638 
16,179,798 
16,507,958 
16,836,118 
17,164,278 
17,492,438 
17,820,599 
18,148,759 
18,476,919 
18,805,079 
19,133,239 
19,461,399 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FORECAST FOR ATK's 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression Output: 
163 
TIME 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
PAX L.F 
60.4 
63.7 
67.5 
62.5 
65.9 
67.4 
64.7 
67 
68.6 
66.1 
71.8 
68.7 
71.1 
71.7 
69.1 
71.1 
69.9 
70 
71.6 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 0.548684 
StdErrofC 0.156474 
tstatistic 3.506557 
62.6715 tstatistic 
1.92914 
0.69691 
19 
16 
Dummy 
-0.7761 
1.73586 
-0.4471 
32.4868 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
72.8691 
73.4178 
73.9664 
74.5151 
75.0638 
75.6125 
76.1612 
76.7099 
77.2586 
77.8072 
78.3559 
78.9046 
79.4533 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FORECAST FOR LOAD] 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 164 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
WEIGHT L.F % 
58.3 
60 
64.9 
60.2 
62.8 
63.1 
62.7 
64.9 
64.3 
62.8 
67.4 
64.7 
66.5 
65.1 
62.7 
63.7 
63.7 
66.5 
67.8 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Regressior 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s) 
Std Err of Coef. 
tstatistic 
Time 
0.483224 
0.14721 
3.28255 
13 YEAR I 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
i Output: 
59.9552 tstatistic 
1.814925 33.03454 
0.526431 
19 
16 
Dummy 
-2.35767 
1.633089 
-1.44369 
=ORECAST 
67.26201 
67.74523 
68.22845 
68.71168 
69.1949 
69.67813 
70.16135 
70.64457 
71.1278 
71.61102 
72.09424 
72.57747 
73.06069 
BRITISH AIRWAYS WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR F 
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71 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR ASKs 165 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 O) 
DUM 
0 
ASKs 
47,811,046 
0 55,580,721 
0 60,861,588 
0 
0 
0 
64,323,912 
59,279,615 
55,328,203 
0 53,361,070 
0 55,369,604 
0 
0 
0 
1 
59,812,558 
61,134,627 
64,352,950 
82,911,466 
85,034,980 
93,192,295 
1 90,908,324 
1 
102,023,168 
114,496,940 
116,974,000 
122,063,000 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficient 2186468 
Std Err of Coe 687264.5 
tstatistic 3.181407 
Regression Output: 
44809907.05 tstatistic 
8473165.941 5.288449 
0.890052693 
19 
16 
Dummy 
22250353.89 
7624244.412 
2.918368391 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
110,789,630 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
112,976,098 
115,162,566 
117,349,035 
119,535,503 
121,721,972 
123,908,440 
126,094,909 
128,281,377 
130,467,845 
132,654,314 
134,840,782 
137,027,251 
BRITISH AIRWAYS ASKs FORECAST! 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR RTC 166 
/EAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
1 
1 
RTC 
3,612,618 
4,213,689 
4,930,199 
4,771,279 
4,604,933 
4,310,184 
4,160,987 
4,612,403 
5,053,481 
5,047,905 
5,740,198 
7,328,331 
7,811,111 
8,468,500 
8,280,811 
9,397,557 
10,077,460 
10,792,000 
11,667,000 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared I 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficie 
Time 
257844 
StdErrofC 62026.71 
tstatistic 
13 YEAR 
20 
N)
 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
4.156984 
FORECAST 
10,388,144 
10,645,988 
10,903,832 
11,161,676 
11,419,520 
11,677,364 
11,935,208 
12,193,052 
12,450,896 
12,708,740 
12,966,584 
13,224,428 
13,482,272 
3094561 tstatistic 
764716.6 4.046677 
0.919946 
19 
16 
Dummy 
2136703 
688100.1 
3.105221 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FORECASTING FOR RTC 
14 
13 
c/) 
| 12 
O 
J¥ 
0 
<r 
,0 
® 
0 
0 
11 o 
>^ 
o 
10 
15 20 25 
YEARS 
13 YEARS FORECAST 
30 35 
BA PROFIT VS PAX L.F 167 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1995 
I 
profit 
86.6 
271.8 
206.7 
252.7 
220.8 
258.2 
307.2 
395.9 
174.5 
442.1 
395 
178 
250 
dummy 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
PAX L.F 
67.4 
64.7 
67 
68.6 
66.1 
71.8 
68.7 
71.1 
71.7 
69.1 
71.1 
69.9 
71.6 
W/OUT DUMMY 
Regression Output: 
Constant 67.91446 1 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
PROFIT 
X Coefficie -0.00145 
Std Err of C 0.006067 
tstatistic -0.23982 
W/DUMMY 
1.873213 
0.41233 
14 
11 
L.F 
2.925059 
1.138139 
2.570036 
t.statistic 
36.25561 
Regression Output: 
Constant -714.949 tstatistic 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
PROFIT 
X Coefficie 0.394475 
StdErrofC 0.253419 
tstatistic 1.556608 
1.832852 
0.534793 
13 
9 
DUMMY 
-0.00132 
0.005967 
-0.22169 
-390.074 
L.F 
0.355716 
2.053483 
0.173226 
PROFIT VS PASSENGER L.F 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS EMPLOYEE VS PROFIT 168 
Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
irted 198 
employee 
37954 
33990 
36189 
37955 
42271 
39684 
48656 
50959 
53615 
47181 
47025 
47642 
49628 
53060 
2 to 1995 
dummy 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
profit 
86.6 
271.8 
206.7 
252.7 
220.8 
258.2 
307.2 
395.9 
174.5 
442.1 
395 
178 
274 
250 
Title 
With The Dummy 
Regression 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
XCoefficie -0.01162 
StdErrofC 0.009317 
tstatistic 1.24748 
Output: 
657.8756 t.statistic 
87 13657 
0.307844 
14 
11 
Profit 
222.0965 
118.8474 
1.868754 
Employee & Profit Without Dummy 
Regression 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
XCoefficie 9.305144 
StdErrofC 12.15983 
tstatistic 0.765237 
Output: 
7.549937 
214.9236 
135.057 
1.591354 
225.3459 t.statistic 
97 45614 
0.134192 
14 
11 
Profit 
-0.00067 
0.007765 
-0.0861 
2.31228 
60 
M , A fa 
/ 
j 
/ 
I ! I 
, 
employee 
profit 
m m m m m W\ 
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BRITISH AIRPORT AUTHORITY REGRESSION 169 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
— 
PAX. CARRI 
40.6 
44 
43.3 
43.7 
44.1 
46.5 
51.6 
53.4 
56 
63.7 
68 
71.3 
72 
72 
77.7 
82 
87.7 
*Startedat1979to1995 
Privatized in 1987 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observation 
Degrees of Freedo 
X Coefficient(s) 
Std Err of Coef. 
tstatistic 
Regression Output: 
35.36536 tstatistic 
2.590576 
0.975273 
17 
14 
Time 
2.331373 
0.256505 
9.088986 
13.65154 
Dummy 
7.461111 
2.517587 
2.963596 
10 YEAR FORECAST 
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21 
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26 
27 
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BAA-FORECASTED CARRIED PASSENGERS 
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BAA REGRESION ANALYSIS 170 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
CARGO & MAIL(OOOs) 
729 
737 
707 
699 
685 
746 
839 
835 
864 
951 
1021 
1090 
1082 
1079 
1156 
1305 
1480 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 37.29412 
StdErrofC 8.240182 
tstatistic 4.525885 
573.6405 tstatistic 
83.22176 6.892915 
0.888276 
17 
14 
Dummy 
68.38889 
80.87702 
0.845591 
10 YEARS FORECAST 
18 
19 
20 
ro
 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
1313.324 
1350.618 
1387.912 
1425.206 
1462.5 
1499.794 
1537.088 
1574.382 
1611.676 
1648.971 
z 
o 
1700 
1600 
1500 
1400 
1300 
BAA-FORECASTED CARGO&MAIL 
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10YEARFORECASTE 
BAA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 171 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
AIR TRANSPORT MOVEMENT 
512 
555 
550 
537 
559 
580 
603 
619 
626 
680 
715 
766 
791 
815 
847 
871 
895 
Regression Output: 
Constant 469.6046 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coeffici 20.32353 
Std Err of 2.523403 
tstatistic 8.054017 
25.48512 
0.966081 
17 
14 
Dummy 
53.52778 
24.76709 
2.161247 
t.statistic 
18.42662 
FORECAS 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
10 YEAR 
888.9559 
909.2794 
929.6029 
949.9265 
970.25 
990.5735 
1010.897 
1031.221 
1051.544 
1071.868 
BAA-FORECASTED AIR TRANSPORT MOVEMENTS] 
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BAA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 172 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
__ 
REVENUE 
162.2 
191.4 
254 
277 
283.7 
316 
362 
396 
439 
523 
641 
747 
834 
903 
952 
1098 
1159 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 55.75 
StdErrofC 7.50985 
tstatistic 7.423583 
Regression Output: 
19.17222 tstatistic 
75.84577 0.252779 
0.95323 
17 
14 
Dummy 
85.32778 
73.70884 
1.157633 
10 year forecaste 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
1108 
1163.75 
1219.5 
1275.25 
1331 
1386.75 
1442.5 
1498.25 
1554 
1609.75 
BAA-FORECASTED REVENUE 
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BAA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 173 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
EXPENDITURE 
131.6 
156.3 
216.1 
237.8 
245.1 
264.6 
289.6 
309 
343 
379 
443 
491 
503 
661 
628 
730 
758 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 37.31373 
Std Err of C 4.692859 
tstatistic 7.951172 
Regression Output: 
57.1092 tstatistic 
47.3955 1.2049475733 
0.95055 
17 
14 
Dummy 
13.2806 
46.0602 
0.28833 
10 year forecaste 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
• 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
742.037 
779.35 
816.664 
853.978 
891.292 
928.605 
965.919 
1003.23 
1040.55 
1077.86 
BAA-FORECASTED EXPENDITURE 
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BAA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 174 
YEAR 
1* 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
PROFIT AFTER TAX 
15.6 
23 
18.3 
22.4 
21 
17.6 
24.9 
40 
40 
78 
92 
205 
129 
153 
211 
240 
279 
Starts at 1979 to 1995 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 12.26961 
StdErrofC 3.873228 
tstatistic 3.167799 
Regression Output: 
-36.5925 tstatistic 
39.11768 -0.93545 
0.835622 
17 
14 
Dummy 
44.32778 
38.01555 
1.166043 
10 year forecaste 
18 229 
19 241 
20 253 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
265 
278 
290 
302 
314 
327 
339 
BAA-FORCASTEDPROFIT 
360 
X 
X 
X 
22 
YEARS 
;1CI YEARS FORECASTE 
24 26 
^> 
28 
BAA PASSENGERS CARRIED VS. REVENUE 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
l 5 
6 
7 
8 
I 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
PAX. CARRIEDS(M) 
40.6 
44 
43.3 
43.7 
44.1 
46.5 
51.6 
53.4 
56 
63.7 
68 
71.3 
72 
72 
77.7 
82 
87.7 
DUMMY 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
REVENUE 
162.2 I 
191.4 
254 I 
277 I 
283.7 
316 
362 
396 ! 
439 
523 
641 
747 
834 
903 
952 
1098 
1159 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s) 
Std Err of Coef. 
tstatistic 
PASSENGERS 
11.3197428569971 
15.54147157995125 
0.728357208567028 
-654.805 tstatistic 
59.7511 
0.973047 
17 
13 
DUMMY 
19.05755 
6.164326 
3.091587 
-10.9589 
REVENUE 
-56.8627 
74.07551 
-0.76763 
BAA CARGO AND MAIL VS. REVENUE 176 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
CARGO & MAIL(OOOs) 
729 
737 
707 
699 
685 
746 
839 
835 
864 
951 
1021 
1090 
1082 
1079 
1156 
1305 
1480 
DUMMY 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
REVENUE 
162.2 
191.4 
254 
277 
283.7 
316 
362 
396 
439 
523 
641 
747 
834 
903 
952 
1098 
1 | 1159 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s) 
Std Err of Coef. 
tstatistic 
Regression 
CARGO 
31.55331 
8.589636 
3.673417 
Output: 
-353.01 
55.27546 
0.976933 
17 
13 
DUMMY 
0.648807 
0.177514 
3.654973 
t.statistic 
-6.38638 
REVENUE 
40.95658 
55.07278 
0.743681 
BAA AIR MOVEMENT VS REVENUE 177 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
AIR TRANSPORT MOVEMENT 
512 
555 
, 550 
537 
559 
580 
603 
619 
626 
680 
715 
766 
791 
815 
847 
871 
895 
DUMMY 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
REVENUE 
162.2 
191.4 
254 
277 
283.7 
316 
362 
396 
439 
523 
641 
747 
834 
903 
952 
1098 
1159 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s) 
Std Err of Coef. 
tstatistic 
enplinment 
2.169407 
8.58196 
0.252787 
1218.88 tstatistic 
36.51762 
0.989932 
17 
13 
dummy 
2.636382 
0.382959 
6.88425 
-33.378 
revenue 
-55.7919 
40.98362 
1.36132 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 178 
YEAR 
1* 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 o
 o
 o
 o
 
!
 i 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ATKs 
1,067,188 
1,150,987 
1,229,346 
1,328,021 
1,350,349 
1,422,159 
1,666,381 
1,779,834 
1,993,288 
2,045,815 
2,321,657 
2,580,126 
2,362,731 
itarted 1980 upto 1992 
ivatized in 1988 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 110211.7 
StdErrofC 13328.87 
tstatistic 8.268643 
892003.2 tstatistic 
107460.8 8.300733 
0.962404 
13 
10 
Dummy 
168145.1 
108056.1 
1.55609 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
2,603,111 
2,713,323 
2,823,535 
2,933,746 
3,043,958 
3,154,170 
3,264,381 
3,374,593 
3,484,805 
3,595,016 
3,705,228 
3,815,440 
3,925,651 
AIR NEW ZEALAND FORECASTED ATK 
C 
05 
C/> 
O 
4000 
3500 
3000 
2500 
s* 
X 
& 
O"' 
J* 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST! 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 179 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ASKs 
8,277,599 
8,846,351 
9,324,747 
10,046,267 
10,417,803 
11,000,039 
12,773,965 
13,614,797 
15,316,471 
15,041,242 
16,475,019 
l^ 7,358,051 
17,589,331 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 839641.3 
StdErrofC 66230.53 
tstatistic 12.67756 
6870465 
533967.6 
0.978705 
13 
10 
Dummy 
89571.4 
536925.9 
0.166823 
tstatistic 
12.86682 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
18,715,014 
19,554,655 
20,394,297 
21,233,938 
22,073,579 
22,913,220 
23,752,862 
24,592,503 
25,432,144 
26,271,786 
27,111,427 
27,951,068 
28,790,709 
30 
28 
26 
CO 
c § 24 
1 2 2 
20 
18 
AIR NEW ZEALND FORECASTED ASK 
•O 
Jf ,o 
^ 
J& 
J^ 
jy 
j f 
10 15 20 
YEAR 
13 YEAR FORECAST j 
J> ,o 
25 30 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
/EAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
RPKs 
5663803 
5676643 
5846749 
6440587^ 
7110304 
7814637 
8731876 
9562934 
10728939 
10096835 
10602846 
10625327 
11885671 
180 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 642434.1 
StdErrofC 54305.27 
4296326 tstatistic 
437823.1 9.812929 
0.967397 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-881649 
440248.7 
tstatistic 11.83005 -2.00262 
YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
12,408,755 
13,051,189 
13,693,623 
14,336,057 
14,978,491 
15,620,925 
16,263,359 
16,905,794 
17,548,228 
18,190,662 
18,833,096 
19,475,530 
20T117,964 
AIR NEW ZEALAND FORECASTED RPK 
22 
20 
£ 18 
| 16 
14 
12 
10 
o-
20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
25 30 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
PAX L.F 
68.4 
64.2 
62.7 
64.1 
68.3 
71 
68.4 
70.2 
70 
67.1 
64.4 
61.2 
67.6 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 0.643846 
StdErrofC 0.334061 
tstatistic 1.927328 
64.25855 tstatistic 
2.69329 23.85876 
0.371806 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-6.58778 
2.708211 
-2.43252 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
67 
67 
68 
69 
69 
70 
71 
71 
72 
72 
73 
74 
74 
AIR NEW ZEALAND FORECASTED L.F 
76 
25 74 
DC 
£ 7 2 
O 
< 
i 70 
Q 
< 
2 68 6 
10 
.XX 
0 
s*r 
^ 
<*> 
15 20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST j 
25 30 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 182 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
[REVENUE 
531.3 
490 
557.7 
587.7 
588.6 
661.3 
611.2 
876.1 
1011 
1016 
658 
593.9 
1219.3 
Regression Output: 
Revenue from 1980 to 1992 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 54.31692 
StdErrofC 21.88027 
tstatistic 2.482462 
385.6265 tstatistic 
176.4044 2.186037 
0.506428 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-138.471 
177.3817 
-0.78064 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
1,008 
1,062 
1,116 
1,171 
1,225 
1,279 CO
 
00 
CO
 CO
 
CO
 CO
 
1,442 
1,496 
1,551 
1,605 
1,659 
AIR NEW ZEALAND FORECASTED REVENU 
1800 
1600 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
~ 
,xr 
x> 
O" 
<r" o 
jy 
* 
10 
0 
15 
X 
20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
25 30 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 183 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
EXPENDITURE 
556.6 
521.7 
567.2 
521.2 
501.5 
594.3 
560.8 
835 
962.8 
993.6 
580.9 
558.19 
1113.2 
Regression Output: 
Constant ~ 409.7171 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 42.96992 
StdErrofC 22.51485 
tstatistic 1.908515 
181.5205 
0.396806 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-92.3987 
182.5262 
-0.50622 
tstatistic 
2.257139 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25" 
26 
919 
962 
1,005 
1,048 
1,091 
1,134 
1,177 
1,220 
1,263 
1,306 
1,349 
1,392 
1,435 
AIR NEW ZEALND FORECASTED EXPENC 
1600 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST | 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
NET RESULT 
-29.3 
-28.5 
-10.3 
67.4 
68.9 
95.2 
87 
39.4 
42.3 
48 
18 
30.5 
63.5 
Regression 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 11.41538 
StdErrofC 4.207372 
tstatistic 2.713187 
Output: 
-20.1769 
33.92091 
0.424775 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-71.1 
34.10884 
-2.0845 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
69 
80 
91 
103 
114 
126 
137 
148 
160 
171 
183 
194 
206 
AIR NEW ZEALND FORECASTED PROFITI 
- _ - - - * 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
O 
^r 
J^ 
XX 
jy ,o 
^ 
.XT 
X> 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST f 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
EMPLOYEE 
8823 
8300 
6980 
6864 
7020 
7290 
7820 
8229 
8668 
9419 
8057 
7883 
7498 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
NET RESULT 
-29.3 
-28.5 
-10.3 
67.4 
68.9 
95.2 
87 
39.4 
42.3 
48 
18 
30.5 
63.5 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 10.9505071354 
Std Err of Coef. 4.01699253506 
tstatistic 2.72604617505 
120.7504 tstatistic 
32.27969 3.740754 
0.531183 
13 
9 
Dummy Profit 
-0.01782 -60.2876 
0.012469 33.32846 
-1.42924 -1.80889 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 186 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
EMPLOYE 
8823 
8300 
6980 
6864 
7020 
7290 
7820 
8229 
8668 
9419 
8057 
7883 
7498 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
PAX L.F 
68.4 
64.2 
62.7 
64.1 
68.3 
71 
68.4 
70.2 
70 
67.1 
64.4 
61.2 
67.6 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 0.684461 
Std Err of Coef. 0.311223 
tstatistic 2.199263 
51.94616 tstatistic 
2.500921 20.77081 
0.512505 
13 
9 
Dummy L.F 
0.001557 -7.53242 
0.000966 2.582176 
1.611692 -2.91708 
AIR NEW ZEALAND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 187 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
EMPLOYE 
8823 
8300 
6980 
6864 
7020 
7290 
7820 
8229 
8668 
9419 
8057 
7883 
7498 
DUM 
I 0 
r o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
REVENUE! 
531.3 
490 
557.7 
587.7 
588.6 
661.3 
611.2 
876.1 
1011 
1016 
658 
593.9 
1219.3 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 56.37349 
Std Err of Coef. 21.5354 
tstatistic 2.617713 
-237.822 
173.0539 
0.572499 
13 
9 
Dummy 
0.078842 
0.06685 
1.179394 
Revenue 
-186.304 
178.6764 
1.04269 
AEROLINEAS ARGRNTINA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 188 
YEAR 
1 CM
 CO
 
4 
5 
6 
7 
CO
 
00
 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ATKs 
1,554,119 
1,588,697 
1,417,993 
1,386,259 
1,320,723 
1,432,821 
1,363,462 
1,491,265 
1,434,620" 
1,536,908 
1,671,053 
1,683,699 
1,800,179 
Regression Output: 
arted 1980 to 1992 
ivatized in 1990 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 6682.226 
StdErrofC 10169.62 
tstatistic 0.657078 
1432445 tstatistic 
106902 
0.527839 
13 
10 
Dummy 
225966.3 
105463.1 
2.14261 
13.39961 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
1,751,962 
1,758,645 
1,765,327 
1,772,009 
1,778,691 
1,785,373 
1,792,056 
1,798,738 
1,805,420 
1,812.102 
1,818,785 
1,825,467 
1,832,149 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED AT 
1840 
1820 
| 1800 
(0 
(/> 
| 1780 
r -
1760 
1740 
^ 
J¥ ^ 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST! 
AEROLINEAS ARGRNTINA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 189 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
PRKs 
6926788 
6132471 
5148958 
5079921 
5628120 
6284832 
6653993 
7347713 
7730081 
8254170 
8431987 
8077800 
8988845 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 269440.2 
StdErrofC 73782.52 
tstatistic 3.651816 
5075998 tstatistic 
775594.3 
0.695747 
13 
10 
Dummy 
89321.9 
765155.1 
0.116737 
6.544657 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
8,937,483 
9,206,923 
9,476,363 
9,745,803 
10,015,243 
10,284,684 
10,554,124 
10.823,564 
11,093,004 
11,362,444 
11,631,885 
11,901,325 
12,170,765 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED R[ 
12 
lio
ns
 
^ 10 
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/EAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ASKs 
11256951 
11813384 
10666755 
10597238 
10981735 
11221824 
10685100 
12021056 
12030024 
12892652 
13121332 
13161200 
14124118 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficient(s) 187884.6 
Std Err of Coef. 62407.61 
tstatistic 3.010603 
10444334 tstatistic 
656022.5 
0.721678 
13 
10 
Dummy 
849768.4 
647192.7 
1.313007 
15.9207 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
13,924,486 
14,112,370 
14,300,255 
14,488,140 
14,676,024 
14,863,909 
15,051,793 
15,239,678 
15,427,562 
15,615,447 
15,803,331 
15,991,216 
16,179,101 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED 
16500 
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AEROLINEAS ARGRNTINA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
2 
3 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
PAX L.F 
61.5 
51.9 
48.3 
47.9 
60.8 
56.8 
62.3 
61.1 
64.3 
64 
64.3 
61.4 
63.6 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 1.261538 
StdErrofC 0.448651 
tstatistic 2.811845 
Regression Output: 
50.9035 tstatistic 
4.716178 10.79338 
0.477547 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-4.17273 
4.6527 
-0.89684 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
64 
66 
67 
68 
69 
71 
72 
73 
74 
76 
77 
78 
80 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED L 
85 
80 
75 
70 
65 
60 
10 
O o 
o-
15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
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YEAR r 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
REVENUE 
904.7 
875.7 
717.3 
817.7 
627.3 
516.6 
477.2 
516.7 
766.7 
684 
514.7 
740.3 
914.3 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie -29.2643 
StdErrofC 12.08691 
tstatistic -2.42115 
Regression Output: 
850.0037 tstatistic 
127.0564 6.689974 
0.453915 
13 
10 
Dummy 
343.0995 
125.3462 
2.737214 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
783 
754 
725 
696 
666 
637 
608 
579 
549 
520 
491 
461 
432 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED R 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
^ XX 
^<X 
<x O-
>*>. 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST! 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5" 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
EXPENDITl 
889.8 
862.7 
825.5 
959.7 
651.7 
533.9 
494.4 
491.7 
723.9 
653.6 
525.1 
712 
947.4 
Regression Output: 
Constant 905.9529 tstatistic 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie -35.6588 
StdErrofC 12.80138 
tstatistic -2.78554 
134.5668 6.732364 
0.488001 
13 
10 
Dummy 
369.4824 
132.7556 
2.783177 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
776 
741 
705 
669 
634 
598 
562 
527 
491 
455 
420 
384 
348 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED EX 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
o. 
<x 
"<X 
X>„ 
O-
•<x 
<x 
'"<X„ 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST! 
O 
25 
O 
30 
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fEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
"5 
6 
7 
8 
, — . 1 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
NET RESULT I 
12.2 
9.8 
4.9 
-524.7 
-4.5 
-9.7 
-7.2 
10.8 
23.9 
24.6 
-8.1 
14.1 
-188.7 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 8.883258 
StdErrofC 15.60359 
tstatistic 0.569309 
Regression Output: 
-95.845 tstatistic 
164.0234 -0.58434 
0.043072 
13 
10 
Dummy 
-102.496 
161.8157 
-0.63341 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
(74) 
(65) 
(56) 
(47) 
(38) 
(30) 
(21) 
(12) 
(3) 
6 
15 
24 
33 
AEROLINEAS ARGENTINA FORECASTED NET PRO 
40 
20 
0 
-20 
-40 
-60 
-80 
*S 
.<y 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
113 YEAR FORECAST} 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
EMPLOYEi 
10096 
9981 
9835 
9822 
10303 
10276 
10323 
10351 
10372 
10791 
9482 
8441 
9811 
DUM 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
NET RESULT 
12.2 
9.8 
4.9 
-524.7 
-4.5 
-9.7 
-7.2 
10.8 
23.9 
24.6 
-8.1 
14.1 
-188.7 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 8.5349782608 
Std Err of Coef. 16.883556823 
tstatistic 0.5055201549 
-203.958 tstatistic 
172.817 -1.1802 
0.043944 
13 
9 
Dummy Employee 
0.010859 -89.1299 
0.119855 225.4543 
0.090603 -0.39533 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
EMPLOYE 
10096 
9981 
9835 
9822 
10303 
10276 
10323 
10351 
10372 
10791 
9482 
8441 
9811 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
PAX L.F 
61.5 
51.9 
48.3 
47.9 
60.8 
56.8 
62.3 
61.1 
64.3 
64 
64.3 
61.4 
63.6 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 1.154552 
Std Err of Coef. 0.459725 
tstatistic 2.511399 
17.69282 tstatistic 
4.705659 3.759902 
0.531888 
13 
9 
Dummy L.F 
0.003336 -0.06695 
0.003264 6.138927 
1.022133 -0.01091 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
EMPLOYE 
10096 
9981 
9835 
9822 
10303 
10276 
10323 
10351 
10372 
10791 
9482 
8441 
9811 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
REVENUE 
904.7 
875.7 
717.3 
817.7 
627.3 
516.6 
477.2 
516.7 
766.7 
684 
514.7 
740.3 
914.3 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) -31.6762 
Std Err of Coef. 12.59884 
tstatistic -2.51422 
101.2786 tstatistic 
128.9595 0.785353 
0.49369 
13 
9 
Dummy Revenue 
0.075204 435.663 
0.089438 168.2384 
0.840852 2.589557 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 o
 
o
 
o
 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ASKs 
2,194,253 
2,620,620 
2,339,391 
1,803,008 
1,854,791 
2,094,776 
2,307,367 
2,425,974 
2,754,216 
2,929,605 
3,340,004 
3,066,706 
arted with year 1980 upto year 1991 
ivatized in 1989 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
2018767 tstatistic 
329722.2 6.122629 
0.610585 
12 
9 
ASKs 
X Coefficie 57024.21 528809.6 
StdErrofC 36191.72 335237.7 
tstatistic 1.575615 1.577417 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
3,288,891 
3,345,916 
3,402,940 
3,459,964 
3,516,988 
3,574,012 
3,631,037 
3,688,061 
3,745,085 
3,802,109 
3,859,133 
3,916,158 
3,973,182 
LANCHILE-FORCASTED ASK 
4200 
4000 
I 3800 c 
CD 
CO 
I 3600 
3400 
3200 
10 
O 
X> .x> 
0 
^y 
j y 0 
-0 
O 
0 
-0^ 
• > 
c 
15 20 
YEARS 
25 30 
13 YEAR FORECAST T 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ATKs 
401,800 
454,719 
398,960 
325,350 
320,817 
344,030 
378,315 
441,174 
510,040 
585,974 
654,495 
636,123 
Regression Output: 
900 
850 
c 800 
03 
</) 
o 750 
700 
650 
10 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficie 
Std Err of 
tstatistic 
Time 
14576.02 
7912.766 
1.842089 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
667,173 
681,749 
696,325 
710,901 
725,477 
740,053 
754,629 
769,205 
783,781 
798,357 
812,933 
827,509 
842,085 
335949.8 tstatistic 
72088.73 4.660227 
0.6922 
12 
9 
Dummy 
141735 
73294.6 
1.933771 
LANCHILE-FORECASTED ATK| 
<r^ 
> 0 
-0 
0^ O 
0 0 
-0 
O x> 
15 20 25 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
30 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
RPKs 
1,403,490 
1,657,942 
1,308,321 
1,048,058 
1,096,705 
1,280,029 
1,478,794 
1,546,985 
1,760,837 
2,011,604 
2,113,614 
1,910,649 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 52163.72 
Std Err of C 28267.33 
tstatistic 1.845372 
1172376 tstatistic 
257527.6 4.552429 
0.551938 
12 
9 
Dummy 
239872.7 
261835.4 
0.91612 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
13 2,090,377 
14 2,142,541 
15 2,194,705 
16 2,246,868 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2,299,032 
2,351,196 
2,403,359 
2,455,523 
2,507,687 
2,559,851 
2,612,014 
2,664,178 
2,716,342 
LANCHILE-FORECASTED RPK 
2800 
2600 
</> 
c 
S 2400 
o 
2200 
<y x> ^
r 
o 
<y 
jy j> 
o 
0 
2000 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
0 
j y 
J0' 
0 
25 30 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
REVENUE 
85.6 
115.6 
138.6 
98.9 
115.9 
126.3 
144.9 
156.6 
183 
213.1 
243.4 
261.1 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 11.29759 
Std Err of 
tstatistic 
13 YEAR F( 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2.011759 
5.615777 
ORECAST 
269 
280 
292 
303 
314 
326 
337 
348 
360 
371 
382 
393 
405 
75.71325 tstatistic 
18.328 4.13102 
0.914668 
12 
9 
Dummy 
46.61446 
18.63458 
2.501503 
450 
400 
350 
300 
250 
I LANCHILE FORECASTED REVENUE 
:• 
^o 
0 
jy AT 
jy ,<y 
xy 
,^> xr 
o 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
25 30 
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DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
11. 
PAX. L.F 
63.9 
63.3 
55.9 
58.1 
59.1 
61.1 
64.1 
63.8 
63.9 
68.7 
63.3 
62.3 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
X Coefficie 0.637952 
StdErrofC 0.346042 
tstatistic 1.843569 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
13 64 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
64 
65 
66 
66 
67 
68 
68 
69 
69 
23 70 
24 71 
25 71 
58.68127 tstatistic 
3.152591 18.61366 
0.277755 
12 
9 
Dummy 
-3.21771 
3.205326 
-1.00386 
LANCHILE FORECASED LOAD FACTOR 
72 
70 
68 
66 
64 
62 
-
10 
0 
o 
15 
O 
0 
0-
<y 
20 
YEARS 
0 
0 
0 
25 
13 YEAR FORECAST| 
30 
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YEAR 
A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
EXPENDITURE 
120.9 
129.2 
157.3 
119.7 
114.4 
125 
138.3 
151 
179 
210.5 
258.7 
249 
Regressior 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Time 
XCoefficie 7.109639 
StdErrofC 2.408921 
tstatistic 2.951378 
i Output: 
105.427 tstatistic 
21.94632 4.803857 
0.847626 
12 
9 
Dummy 
66.66217 
22.31343 
2.987536 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
265 
272 
279 
286 
293 
300 
307 
314 
321 
329 
336 
343 
350 
LANCHILE FORECASTE EXPENDITURE 
360 
340 
CD 
Z 320 
< 
en 
O 300 
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h-
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,0 
<f 
0' 
0 
O' 
jy 
yy s * 
0 
,0 
10 15 20 
YEARS 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
25 30 
LANCHILE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 204 
YEAR 
A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
NET RESULT 
-10.7 
-7.5 
-30.3 
-36.5 
-19.1 
0.7 
5.9 
4.1 
4.9 
6.4 
-8.5 
3.5 
Constant 
Regression 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficie 
Std Err of C 
tstatistic 
Time 
3.443976 
1.327532 
2.59427 
Output: 
-27.1519 tstatistic 
12.09439 -2.24 
0.441054 
12 
9 
Dummy 
-14.9539 
12.2967 
-1.21609 
13 YEAR FORECAST 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
3 
6 
10 
13 
16 
20 
23 
27 
30 
34 
37 
41 
44 
f LANCHILE FORECASTED NET PROFIT] 
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CO 
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2 30 
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YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
EMPLOYEE 
1551 
1423 
1487 
1372 
1046 
851 
1013 
1028 
1261 
1512 
1743 
1794 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
NET RESULT 
-10.7 
-7.5 
-30.3 
-36.5 | 
-19.1 
0.7 
5.9 i 
4.1 
4.9 
6.4 
-8.5 
3.5 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 3.20939123241 
Std Err of Coef. 1.49469585026 
tstatistic 2.14718682189 
-16.0941 tstatistic 
12.68175 -1.26907 
0.45373 
12 
8 
Dummy Profit 
-0.00779 -9.54323 
0.018073 17.99875 
-0.43085 -0.53022 
CHILE EMPLOYEE VS Load Factor 206 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
EMPLOYE 
1551 
1423 
1487 
1372 
1046 
851 
1013 
1028 
1261 
1512 
1743 
1794 
DUM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
PAX. L.F 
63.9 
63.3 
55.9 
58.1 
59.1 
61.1 
64.1 
63.8 
63.9 
68.7 
63.3 
62.3 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
Employee 
X Coefficient(s) 0.776615 
Std Err of Coef. 0.370418 
tstatistic 2.09659 
52.14499 tstatistic 
3.142813 16.59182 
0.361981 
12 
8 
Dummy L.F 
0.004603 -6.41594 
0.004479 4.460481 
1.027661 -1.4384 
CHILE EMPLOYEE VS Revenue 207 
YEAR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
EMPLOYE 
1551 
1423 
1487 
1372 
1046 
851 
1013 
1028 
1261 
1512 
1743 
1794 
DUM 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
REVENUE 
85.6 
115.6 
138.6 
98.9 
115.9 
126.3 
144.9 
156.6 
183 
213.1 
243.4 
261.1 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s) 
Std Err of Coef. 
tstatistic 
Employee 
13.01168 
1.575381 
8.259384 
-5.08495 tstatistic 
13.36632 -0.38043 
0.959659 
12 
8 
Dummy Revenue 
0.056896 7.079546 
0.019048 18.97034 
2.986953 0.37319 
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RPKS FOR SAUDIA AIRLINES (POLYNOMIAL) 
TIME 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
, 1985 
j 1986 
! 1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
j 1991 
1992 
I 1993 
j 1994 
1995 
RPK | 
4,992,646 
6,771,004 
8,540,150 | 
9,937,985 \ 
10,508,237 
12,277,460 
14,621,488 
15,845,000 
15,856,000 
15,432,000 
16,145,000 
15,444,000 
16,238,000 
16,694,000 
15,585,000 
18,297,000 
19,540,000 
18,249,969 
18,501,426 | 
20,000,000 
15,000,000 
10,000,000 
5.000,000 
• 
• +^ 
y = 
^r5^ 
-46939x2 
R2 = 
+ 
" * " • 
+2E+08x-
= 0.9406 
• 
2E 
+ 
4-11 
• 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
YEARS 
RPKs FOR SAUDIA ARABIAN AIRLINES (LINEAR) 
25,000,000 
20,000,000 
15.000,000 
• • 
10.000,000 i 
5,000,000 I • 
y = 680615x- 1E+09 
R' = 0.8451 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
YRAS 
25,000,000 
20.000,000 
15,000,000 
10,000,000 
5,000,000 
RPKs FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES 
(EXPONENTIAL) 
• • • 
• • 
y = 5E-43e0057: 
R2 = 0 7529 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
25,000,000 
20,000,000 
15,000,000 
10,000,000 
5,000,000 I • 
RPKs FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES 
(LOGRITHMIC) 
• • «L 
y = 1E+09Ln(x)- 1E+10 
R2 = 0.8458 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
TIME 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
ATKs 
1,243,493 
1,660,376 
2,395,939 
2,407,872 
2,711,116 
3,046,925 
3,533,334 
4,097,000 
4,169,000 
4,208,000 
4,272,000 
4,118,000 
4,236,000 
4,438,000 
3,976,000 
4,771,000 
5,240,000 
5,049,530 
5,051,740 
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6,000,000 
5,000,000 
4,000,000 
3,000,000 
2.000,000 
1,000,000 
0 
ATKs FOR SAUDIA AIRLINES (POLYNOMIAL) 
y = -10958xz + 4E+07x - 4E+10 
R2 = 0.9383 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
6.000.000 
5.000.000 
4,000,000 
3,000,000 
2,000,000 
1,000,000 
ATKs FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (LINEAR) 
• • • • . 
y = 192309x-4E+08 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
7,000,000 
6,000,000 
5.000,000 
4,000,000 
3,000,000 
2,000,000 
1,000.000 
0 
ATKs FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (EXPONENTIAL) 
• • • • 
• • 
y = 3E-47e° 
: 0 7751 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
6.000,000 
5,000,000 
4,000,000 
3,000.000 
2,000,000 
1,000,000 
ATKs FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE ( LOGRITHMIC) 
• • • 
y = 4E+08Ln(x) - 3E+09 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
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TIME 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
RTC 
522,300 
749,820 
931,537 
1,069,492 
1,204,099 
1,478,347 
1,767,106 
1,952,000 
1,937,000 
1,871,000 
1,965,000 
1,930,000 
2,100,000 
2,172,000 
1,955,000 
2,381,000 
2,520,000 
2,224,058 
2,224,664 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
RTC FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (POLYNOMIAL) 
y = -6696.2x' + 3E+07x - 3E+10 
R2 = 0.9481 
0 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
RTC FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (LINEAR) 
• • 
y = 94062x - 2E+08 
R2 = 0.846 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
0 
RTC FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (EXPONENTIAL) 
• • 
y = 5E-52eUUDD< 
R2 = 0 7565 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
RTC FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (LOGRTHMIC) 
• • 
• • 
y = 2E+08Ln(x) - 1E+09 
R2 = 0.8468 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
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TIME 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
PAX L.F 
63.1 
66.2 
62.5 
59.8 
57.7 
64.2 
66.9 
63 
60 
55 
57 
57 
61 
60 
63 
64 
61 
62 
64 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
L.F FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (POLYNOMIAL) 
• • 
- * - * -
.» »-
y = 0 0545x2 - 216.43x + 215035 
R2 = 0.2228 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
•_ 
• 
-+-
L.F FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (LINEAR) 
• * *
 r * • ^ A 
' • • * • • * •
 #
* 
y = -0.0593x+ 179.21 
R2 = 0.0109 
• 
... ! 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
70
 r 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
L.F FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE (EXPONENTIAL) 
« ^ > _ _^ v^  
• • 
-^ -r 
• • *^*-
y = 374 8e-0000! 
R2 = 0 0095 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
70 
bU 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
n 
L.F FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE ( LOGRTHMIC) 
+ * • • * * * • • , + • #
 •
 W
 # • •
 W 
y = -118 41Ln(x) + 960 66 
R2 = 0011 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
TRENDLINE FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES 
TIME 
1984 
1985 
1986 
u 1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
REVENUE(billion) 
1,980,266,752 
1,934,661,204 
1,887,733,520 
1,795,733,330 
1,694,133,330 
1,907,466,750 
2,048,450,650 
2,089,650,354 
2,351,733,250 
2,473,066,750 
3.000,000,000 
2,500,000,000 
2,000,000,000 
1,500,000,000 
1,000,000,000 
500,000,000 
0 
RVENUE FOR SAUDIA AIRLINE 
(POLYNOMIAL) 
y = 2E+07x^ - 8E+10x + 8E+13 
R^  = 0.9187 
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
2,500,000,000 
REVENUE FOR SV (LINEAR) 
r 
2,000,000,000 + 
1,500,000,000 
1,000,000,000 
500,000,000 
y = 6E+07x- 1E+11 
R2 = 0.5115 
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
214 
2.500,000,000 
2,000,000,000 + 
1,500.000.000 
1,000,000,000 
500,000,000 
REVENUE FOR SV (EXPONENTIAL) 
1984 
y = 2E-14euu/D< 
R2 = 0.4875 
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
2,500,000,00! 
2.000,000,000 + 
1,500,000,000 
1,000,000,000 
500,000,000 
REVENUE FOR SV ( LOGRITHMIC)] 
o i— 
1984 
y = 1E+11Ln(x)-9E+11 
?2
 = 05109 
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
TRENDLINE FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES 
TIME 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
NET INCOME 
36,799,627 
-38,672,746 
-100,533,230 
-53,917,330 
-261,116,800 
-38,983,870 
-53199671 
-35,416,396 
-23,200,070 
-160,266,583 
NET PROFIT FOR SV (POLYNOMIAL) 
50,000,000 
-50,000, O O d ^ 
-100,000,000 
-150,000,000 
-200,000,000 
-250,000,000 
-300,000,000 
J986 # 1988 • 1^0 • 1^2 
y = 3E+06x2- 1E+10x + 1E+13
 # 
R2 = 0.1358 
-50,000,00d 
-100,000,000 
-150,000,000 
-200,000,000 
-250,000,000 
-300,000,000 
215 
1994 
50,000,000
 4
N E T P R 0 F I T F 0 R S V
 ("-'NEAR) 
1986
 A 1988 • 19S0 • 1992 1994 
y = -7E+06x + 1E+10 
R^  = 0.06 
NET PROFIT FOR SV (EXPONENTIAL) 
50,000,000 
0
 ! 
19B4 
-50,000,000 
-100,000,000 
-150,000,000 j 
-200,000,000 
-250,000,000 ! 
! 
-300,000,000 I 
1988 + 1990 + 1^2 1994 
y = -1E+10Ln(x) + 1E+11 
R2 = 0 0601 
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TIME 
i 1977 
| 1978 
I 1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
| 1985 
I 1986 
1987 
1988 
j 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
RTC | 
3,612,618 
4,213,689 
4,930,199 
4,771,279 
4,604,933 
4,310,184 
4,160,987 
4,612,403 
5,053,481 
5,047,905 
5,740,198 
7,328,331 
7,811,111 
8,468,500 
8,280,811 
9,397,557 
10,077,460 
10,792,000 
11,667,000 j 
12,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
0 
1975 
12,000,000 , 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
0 ' 
1975 
RTC FOR BA ( POLYNOMIAL) 
+±±^r* 
y = 28745x^- 1E+08x + 1E+11 
R^  = 0.9675 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
RTC FOR BA (LINEAR) 
y = 422782x - 8E+08 
R2 = 0.8717 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
12,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
RTC FOR BA (EXPONENETIAL) 
1975 1980 1985 
y = 5E-48eUUDZ 
R2 = 0 8971 
1990 1995 
12,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
0 L _ 
1975 
RTC FOR BA ( LOGRITHMIC) 
• • • • 
y = 8E+08Ln(x) - 6E+09 
R2 = 0.871 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 219 
TIME 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
| 1982 
j 1983 
| 1984 
1985 
! 1986 
i 1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
| 1991 
| 1992 
| 1993 
1994 
1995 
PAX L.F I 
60.4 
63.7 I 
67.5 I 
62.5 
65.9 
67.4 
64.7 
67 
68.6 | 
66.1 
71.8 | 
68.7 | 
71.1 
71.7 
69.1 
71.1 
69.9 
70 
71.6 
72
 r 
70 
68 
66 
64 
62 
60 
1975 
74 
72 
70 
68 
66 
64 
62 
60 
L.F FOR BA (POLYNOMIAL) 
#
 • * •_ • 
• • 
y = -0.0271 xz + 107 94x - 107604 
R^ = 0.7372 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
L.F FOR BA (LINEAR) 
• • 
y = 0.4888x - 902 87 
R2 = 0 6931 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
74
 r 
72 
70 
68 
66 j 
64 | 
62 
60 -
L.F FOR BA (EXPONENTIAL) 
1975 1980 1985 
• • 
y = 3E-05e0007-
R2 = 0 6886 
1990 1995 
74
 r 
72 
70 
68 
66 
64 
62 
60 
1975 
L.F FOR BA (LOGRITHMIC) 
• • 
y = 971.02Ln(x)-7305.9 
R2 = 0.6936 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 220 
TIME 
1977 
1978 
, 1979 
| 1980 
i 1981 
1982 
1983 
j 1984 
i 1985 
| 1986 
! 1987 
I 1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
| 1995 
ASKs 
47,811,046 
55,580,721 
60,861,588 I 
64,323,912 ] 
59,279,615 
55,328,203 
53,361,070 | 
55,369,604 
59,812,558 
61,134,627 
64,352,950 
82,911,466 
85,034,980 
93,192,295 
90,908,324 
102,023,168 
114,496,940 
116,974,000 
122,063,000 
140,000,000 
120,000,000 
100,000,000 
80,000,000 
60,000.000 
40,000,000 
20,000,000 
0 
ASK FOR BA (POLYNOMIAL) 
^ > ^ ^ 
+ • • * ^ ^ - j - * ^ * 
y = 301757x 2 - 1E+09x + 
R2 = 0 9497 
1E-» -12 
1975 
140,000,000
 r 
120,000,000 
100,000,000 
80,000,000 
60,000,000 
40,000,000 
20,000,000 
0 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
ASK FOR BA (LINEAR) 
• • 
• • 
• • 
y = 4E+06x - 8E+09 
?2 = 0 8315 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
140,000,000
 r 
120,000,000 
100,000,000 
80.000,000 
60,000,000 ] 
40,000,000 
20,000,000 
0 t 
1975 
ASK FOR BA (EXPONENTIAL) 
• • 
• • 
1980 1985 
• • 
y = 2E-35e 0 0 4 9 
R2 = 0.8474 
1990 1995 
140,000.000 
120.000.000 
100,000,000 
80,000.000 
60,000.000 
40.000.000 
20,000,000 
0 I— 
1975 
ASK FOR BA (LOGRITHMIC) 
• • 
• • 
y = 8E+09Ln(x)-6E+10 
R2 = 0.8308 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 221 
TIME 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
PROFIT 
86.6 
271.8 
206.7 
252.7 
220.8 
258.2 
307.2 
395.9 
174.5 
442.1 
395 
178 
250 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
BA PROFIT (POLYNOMIAL) 
450 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
450 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
y = -3.334x^+ 13266x- 1E+07 
R2 = 0.3452 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
BA PROFIT (LINEAR) 
y = 10.318x- 20248 
R2 = 0.1607 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
BA PROFIT (EXPONENETIAL) 
• • 
y = 2E-38e0046! 
R2 = 0.1782 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
450 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 , 
50 
0 L 
BA PROFIT ( LOGRITHMIC) 
y = 20531 Ln(x)- 155664 
R2 = 0.161 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
BAA DATA 222 
TIME 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
| 1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
! 1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
! 1995 
PAX. CARRIEDS(M) 
40.6 ~~\ 
44 
L 43.3 J 
43.7 
44.1 
46.5 
51.6 I 
53.4 j 
56 j 
63.7 j 
68 | 
71.3 
72 
72 
77.7 
82 
87.7 j 
90
 r 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1975 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
BAA PAX CARRIED (PLOYNOMIAL) 
y = 0.0935x^  - 368 47x + 363163 
R2 = 0.9774 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
BAA PAX CARRIED (LINEAR) 
y = 2.9897x - 5880 7 
R2 = 0.9598 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1975 
BAA PAX CARRIED (EXPONENTIAL) 
^ > ^ ^ ^ 
^+^<*^ 
y = 3E-42e°05°2* 
R2 = 0.97 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1975 
BAA PAX CARRIED (LOGRITHMIC) 
y = 5939.6Ln(x) - 45048 
1980 1985 
Rz = 0 9595 
1990 1995 
BAA DATA 223 
TIME 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
CARGO & MAIL(OOOs) 
729 
737 
707 j 
699 
685 
_ 746 
839 
835 
864 
951 
1021 
1090 
1082 
1079 
1156 
1305 
1480 
1600 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 
1975 
1600 r 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 ' 
1975 
BAA CARGO (POLYNOMIAL) 
• • • r r 
y = 2.9481x2- 11673x+ 1E+07 
R^ = 0.9601 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
BAA CARGO (LINEAR) 
• • ~r> 
y = 43.328x-85152 
R2 = 0.8826 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
1600 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 
1975 
BAA CARGO ( EXPONENTIAL) 
y = 2E-36euu^ 
R2 = 0.9161 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
1600 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 
1975 
BAA CARGO ( LOGRITHMIC) 
• • 
y = 86065Ln(x) - 652670 
R2 = 0.882 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
BAA DATA 224 
TIME 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
ENPLINMENT 
512 
555 
550 j 
537 j 
559 j 
580 | 
603 
619 j 
626 ; 
680 i 
715 
766 
791 
815 
847 
871 | 
895 
1000 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
BAA ENPLINMENT (POLYNOMIAL) 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
1978 
y = 1.0055x -3971x + 4E+06 
R2 = 0.9839 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
BAA ENPLINMENT 
y = 25.047x - 49090 
R2 = 0.9548 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
BAA ENPLINMENT 
y = 2E-29e0036, 
R2 = 0.9675 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
BAA ENPLINMENT 
900 
800 | 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
1978 
y = 49758Ln(x) - 377201 
R2 = 0.9544 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
BAA DATA 
TIME 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
REVENUE 
162.2 
191.4 
254 
277 
283.7 
316 
362 
396 
439 
523 
641 
747 
834 
903 
952 
1098 
1159 
1200 
1000y 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 
BAA REVENUE (POLYNOMIAL) 
= 3.1109x2 - 12299x + 1E+07 J 
R2 = 0.9923 +/* 
^t^f^* 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
BAA REVENUE (LINEAR) 
y = 63.279x- 125174 
R2 = 0 9488 
0 L 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
BAA REVENUE (EXPONENTIAL) 
1400 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
n 
-
y = 5E-104e012' 
R2 = 0 9892 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
BAA REVENUE (LOGRITHMIC) 
y = 125705Ln(x)-954091 
R2 = 0.9483 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
BAA DATA 226 
TIME 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
! 1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
PKOFIT AFTER TAX I 
, 15.6 ~ | 
, 23 
L 1 8 3 "j 
r 22.4 
21 
17.6 
24.9 
40 
40 
78 
92 
205 
129 
153 
211 
240 ! 
279 
300 
250 > 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
BAA PROFIT (POLYNOMIAL) 
= 1 3848x2 - 5487x + 5E+06 f 
R2 = 0.9337 */ 
*—4t * • A%~-ff*^ 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
300 
250 
200 
150 
BAA PROFIT (LINEAR) 
y= 16.181x-32057 
R2 = 0.8197 
100 | 
50 
0 • • 
• • 
_5CJ978 ^T980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
300 
250 V| 
200 
150 
100 
50 
BAA PROFIT (EXPONENTIAL) 
= 1E-171e02002x 
R2 = 0.914 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
300 
BAA PROFIT (LOGRITHMIC) 
250 y = 32138Ln(x)- 243974 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
R^ = 0.819 
• • • 
• • 
_5(J9[78 <980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
TIME 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
RPKs 
5663803" 
5676643 
5846749 
6440587 
7110304 
7814637 
8731876 
9562934 
10728939 
10096835 
10602846 
10625327 
11885671 
12000000 
10000000 
8000000 
6000000 
4000000 
2000000 
0 L 
AIR NEW ZEALAND 
AIR NEW ZEALAND RPK (POLYNOMIAL) 
227 
y = -5457x^  + 2E+07x - 2E+10 
R2 = 0.9548 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
12000000 
10000000 
8000000 
6000000 
4000000 
2000000 
0 
AIR NEW ZEALAND RPK (LINEAR) 
y = 555238x- 1E+09 
R2 = 0.9543 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
14000000 
12000000 
10000000 
8000000 
6000000 
4000000 
2000000 
AIR NEW ZEALAND (EXPONENTIAL) 
y = 3E-52e 
R2 = 0 9488 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
12000000 
10000000 
8000000 
6000000 
4000000 
2000000 
0 L 
AIR NEW ZEALAND RPK (LOGRITHMIC) 
y = 1E+09Ln(x)-8E+09 
R2 = 0 9544 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
AIR NEW ZEALAND 228 
TIME 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
ASKs 
8,277,599 
8,846,351 
9,324,747 
10,046,267 
10,417,803 
11,000,039 
12,773,965 
13,614,797 
15,316,471 
15,041,242 
16,475,019 
17,358,051 
17,589,331 
20 ooo oob IR N E W Z E A L A N D A S K (POLYNOMIAL) 
15,000,000 
10,000,000 
5,000,000 
0 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
18,000,000 
16,000,000 
14,000,000 
12,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
0 
AIR NEW ZEALAND ASK (LINEAR) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
AIR NEW ZEALAND ASK (EXPONENTIAL) 
20,000,000 
18,000,000 
16,000,000 
14,000,000 
12,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
0 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
AIR NEW ZEALAND ASK (LOGRITHMIC) 
18,000,000 
16,000,000 
14,000,000 
12,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
0 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE 234 
TIME 
j 1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
|j 1985 
j 1986 
| 1987 
| 1988 
; 1989 
i 1990 
1991 
ASKs ""J 
2,194,253 
2,620,620 
2,339,391 
1,803,008 
1,854,791 
2,094,776 
2,307,367 
2,425,974 
2,754,216 
2,929,605 
3,340,004 
3,066,706 
3,500,000 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
0 
CHILE ASK (POLYNOMIAL) 
3,500,000 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
• "* •—-
• 
• • 
- • 
—•-" 
y = 21965x2 - 9E+07x + 9E+10 
R2 = 0 7583 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
3,500,000 
3,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
0 
CHILE ASK (LINEAR) 
y = 94004x - 2E+08 
R2 = 0.5029 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE ASK (EXONENTIAL) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
3,500,000 
3,000.000 
2.500,000 
2,000,000 ' 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
0 
CHILE ASK (LOGARITHMIC) 
• • 
y = 2E+08Ln(x)- 1E+09 
R2 = 0 5024 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE 235 
TIME 
1980 
L 1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
RPKs-] 
1,403,490 
1,657,942 
1,308,321 
1,048,058 
1,096,705 
1,280,029 
1,478,794 
1,546,985 
1,760,837 
2,011,604 
2,113,614 
1,910,649 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
CHILE RPK (POLYNOMIAL) 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
• • 
y = 14712x'-6E+07x + 6E+10 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE RPK (LINEAR) 
•
 A 
• • 
• 
"•~~ -"•"""" 
• 
• J _ 
y = 68938x- 1E+08 
R2 = 0 5102 
0 L_ 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
2,500.000 
CHILE RPK (EXPONENTIAL) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 j 
1,500,000 i 
1,000,000 
500,000 
0 
CHILE RPK (LOGARITHMIC) 
y= 1E+08Ln(x)-1E+09 
R2 = 0 5096 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE 236 
TIME 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
ATKs " 
401,800 
454,719" 
398,960 
325,350 
320,817 
344,030 
378,315 
441,174 
510,040 
585,974 
654,495 
636,123 
CHILE ATK (POLYNOMIAL) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
700,000 
600,000 I 
500,000 
400,000 
300,000 
200,000 
100,000 
0 
CHILE ATK (LINEAR) 
y = 24488x - 5E+07 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
700,000 
600,000 
500,000 
400,000 
300,000 
200,000 
100.000 
0 
CHILE ATK (EXPONENTIAL) 
• • 
y = 3E-38e00501x 
R2 = 0.5192 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
700.000 
600.000 
500.000 
400,000 
300,000 
200,000 
100,000 
• 
CHILE ATK (LOGARITHMIC) 
• • 
^-^7^^ 
y = 5E+07Ln(x)-4E+08 
R2 = 0.5637 
0 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE 237 
TIME 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
"REVENUE 
85.6 
115.6 
138.6 
98.9 
115.9 
126.3 
144.9 
156.6 
183 
213.1 
243.4 
261.1 
CHILE REVENUE (POLYNOMIAL) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
300 CHILE REVENUE (LINEAR) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE REVENUE (EXPONENTIAL) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
• 
CHILE REVENUE (LOGARITHMIC) 
• 
^^•^+ 
- • 
y = 28896Ln(x) - 219271 
R2 = 0.8549 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
CHILE 238 
TIME 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
NEi RESULTl 
-10.7 
-7.5 _J 
-30.3 H 
L -36.5 
-19.1 
0.7 
5.9 
4.1 
4.9 
6.4 
-8.5 
3.5 
CHILE PROFIT (POLYNOMIAL) 
988 1990 1992 
y = -0.0197x^  + 80.448x - 82253 
R2 = 0.3494 
-10 
-15 
-20 
-25 
-30 
-35 
-40 
CHILE PROFIT (LINEAR) 
1988 1990 1992 
y = 2.3983x-4769 
R^  = 0.3492 
CHILE PROFIT (LOGARITHMIC) 
-10 
-15 
-20 
-25 
-30 
-35 
-40 
1988 1990 1992 
y = 4761.8Ln(x)-36167 
R2 = 0 3492 
